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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates modality within a procedural
framework. It is mainly concerned -with dynamic modality;
procedures are defined for the dynamic senses of can and
must. This is done within a small query program for a
limited domain, but the procedures for the modals are
general and would be valid in other domains.
The program uses a planner and in addition employs two
pragmatic concepts, the focus of a question, which is
related to the conversational goal of the questioner, and
the possible higher level goals that the interlocutors may
have.
Dynamically modalised questions can be used to ask
about the possibility or necessity of an action with
respect to such an (explicit or implicit) goal. In
determining the degree of modality the procedures proposed
here test whether carrying out the action is compatible
with achieving the goal.
A proposal is made to extend the system to handle
deontic modality.
Epistemic modality and its relation to root modality are
discussed in a more general way. Finally, some theoretical
consequences of handling modals in a procedural framework
are discussed.
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1.1. The aim and the scope of the study
The aim of this study is to investigate how some
aspects of modality could be handled in a language
understanding system. It deals with the semantics and
pragmatics of some English modals, and attempts to give a
procedural definition of them. Root modality will be the
main concern, although epistemic modality is also discussed
briefly.
The main part of the study proposes a procedural
treatment for the root senses of modals like must and can
and the related semi-modals HAVE TO, and BE ABLE TO. In
the discussion of epistemic modality and epistemic senses
of modals like must and may, consideration is given to how
far the procedural treatment proposed for the root modals
is relevant or applicable to the treatment of epistemic
modals.
The method of investigation is to work out how these
modals could be defined in a natural language question
answering system. In the system the domain of discourse
is limited and the form of questions is restricted to ones
that expect a modalised answer. The modality expressed in
the questions and answers is dynamic modality. An example
program deals with such a restricted fragment.
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Although many of the proposals and conclusions in this
thesis relate to the construction of the example program,
the aim is to keep the discussion on a broader basis and
consider other aspects of modality as well as those that
come up in the limited fragment of English. Following the
example of Isard (1974: 233), the program is intended as a
"small working model" to illustrate the proposals made. The
program is not to be understood, however, as a model of
how actual speakers behave, but as an example of one way
of dealing with the problems that are encountered in
trying to represent the meanings of modals. In other
words, no psycholinguistic claims are made.
The domain of discourse chosen for the study was that
of house construction. The task of the system is to
answer questions about the timing of the different jobs
within the construction schedule. It is assumed that it is
important to finish the construction of the house by a
certain date. The timing of a given job is restricted by
constraints such as which jobs must have been completed
before that job can be started, and the starting or
completing of some other jobs may be dependent on that
one being completed first. The timing of all jobs may thus
affect the completion time of the house. The task of
providing information about the optimal schedule can thus
be seen as a useful one. Questions like the following might
occur in this domain:
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(1) Can the painters start on the 29th?
(2) Must the painters start on the 29th?
(3) When can the electricians start?
(4) When should the rough plumbing be finished?
Details of the domain and an outline of the system will be
given in chapter 2.
The scope of the study is narrow in the sense that only
present tense forms of the modal verbs are considered;
past tense forms or expressions in which the main
predication refers to past time are not discussed. The
modals relating to the expression of futurity, will and
shall, are also excluded. The question of the relation of
modality to time and tense is therefore outside the scope
of this study. Although the scope is limited, it has the
advantage that it was possible to investigate the problems
of dynamic and deontic modality in much more detail.
This is a study about the semantics and pragmatics of
modal verbs. Except for the fragment of syntax that is
needed for the parser of the example program, it will not
deal with the grammar of modal verbs or the details of
how they are used in speech. These areas have been
1
extensively covered in the literature .
1.2. Some kinds of modality and some issues
The issues, categories and terms that are relevant to
the study of modality and modal verbs will be introduced
relative to one important investigation of the English
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modals, Palmer's (1979) 'Modality and the English modals'. In
this section, references will be made to other studies as
well, but other research will be more fully discussed in
later sections.
Palmer's study is a detailed taxonomy of the English
modals and a comprehensive, corpus-based description of
their uses. The starting-point for Palmer's discussion are
the modes distinguished by von Wright (1951: 1-2); these
include the alethic, the epistemic, and the deontic mode.
Of these, the epistemic and the deontic mode are the ones
that have received most attention in studies on modality in
natural language.
Epistemic modality expresses the speaker's assessment of
the truth of a proposition on the basis of what he believes
or knows, as in
(5) He may be in his study.
(6) He must be in his study.
Deontic modality has to do with whether an action or an
event is permitted, obligatory, or prohibited:
(7) May I come in?
(8) You must close the door.
(9) You mustn't leave the door open.
(10) All books must be returned in June.
In deontic modality, the permission, obligation, etc., may be
imposed either by the speaker (cf. examples 7-9), or it may
be imposed by some external source and only stated or
reported by the speaker (cf. example 10). The 'source' who
or which imposes the obligation, etc., is usually called the
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deontic source, although Palmer does not use this term.
The modality that occurs in logic, in the form of the
logical operators POSSIBLE (the proposition is true in some
possible world) and NECESSARY (the proposition is true in all
possible worlds) can also be expressed in natural language;
this is the alethic mode. It is expressed by the same
modals as epistemic modality: for example
(11) If a prime p is a factor of the product ab,
then p must be a factor of either a or b.
but it is not as common as epistemic modality. Palmer
leaves alethic modality entirely out of his study. It will
not be discussed in this thesis either, but it is mentioned
here as some references will be made to it.
In addition to these categories, Palmer introduces a new
category, called dynamic modality. Dynamic modality nas to
do with whether an action or an event is possible in the
sense of whether it is feasible: whether it can be done, or
whether it is necessary in order to achieve something.
Dynamic modality and the justification for treating it as a
(to some extent) separate category from deontic modality
will be dealt with in detail below.
The term 'degree of modality' is a central notion in this
thesis. It will be used to refer to the degree of
commitment to the truth of the proposition, or to the
desirability or otherwise of the proposed action; i.e.
necessity, possibility, and impossibility, as well as
obligation, permission and prohibition are degrees of
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modality. In natural language there are usually considered
to be intermediate degrees of modality as well, as in
(12) It will probably rain tonight.
(13) You should do your homework.
In these, the degree of modality is somewhere between
possibility and necessity, or between permission and (strict)
obligation. (Palmer does not discuss this point, but cf.
Halliday 1970, Lyons 1977, Hakulinen & Karlsson 1979.)
Let us clarify the concept of dynamic modality, and the
extent to which it differs from the other modalities.
Dynamic possibility is usually expressed by CAN or BE ABLE
TO. Two kinds of dynamic possibility can be distinguished:
circumstantial possibility, and possibility in the sense of
ability (Palmer 19 79). Examples of the ability sense are
found in (14) and (15), where the possibility or feasibility
of the action depends on the subject's ability to perform
the action:
(14) I can swim.
(15) They can't speak English.
In contrast, (16) and (17) are examples of circumstantial
possibility, where the possibility or the feasibility of the
action depends on circumstances:
(16) We can't go swimming tomorrow.
(17) Well, I'll see what can be done and give you
a ring. (Palmer 1979: 72)
The following situation, taken from the domain of house
construction used in this thesis, exemplifies circumstantial
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dynamic modality, possibility in (a) and necessity in (b):
(18) Can the painters start on the 29th?
a. Yes, they can.
b. They must start then if the house is to
be finished on time.
Possibility or necessity of the painters' starting at the
given time depends on some circumstance, for example, the
goal of completing the house by an agreed date.
Circumstantial dynamic modality will be a central concern
in this thesis.
These examples have intuitively different meanings from
examples of epistemic modality. Compare example (19)
(dynamic) to (20) (epistemic):
(19) The painters can start on the 30th.
(20) The painters may start on the 30th.
(19) says that a course of action is feasible; (20) says that
something may happen.
In this thesis a distinction will be made between
deontic and dynamic modality. The term 'dynamic modality'
will normally be used in a sense close to Palmer's
'circumstantial dynamic modality'. Making a distinction
between dynamic modality and deontic modality can be
justified on the following grounds.
The term 'deontic' is traditionally used to refer to
modalities that express duty, obligation and permission,
both by linguists and by philosophers. In examples of
dynamic modality, such as (18) and (19), duty, obligation and
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permission play no part; the degree of modality depends on
circumstances.
In the kind of deontic modality where the deontic
source is something other than the speaker (of the
modalised utterance), it may be another person, whose
deontic statement is being reported, or it may be rules,
regulations or a moral or ethical code. According to Lyons
(1977: 834, 840) a deontically modalised sentence contains
the sense "X obligates that p", or "X permits p", where X is
the deontic source.
In dynamic modality, too, there may be something
equivalent to a 'source'. X is the circumstance or cause
that makes an action possible or necessary or impossible,
but the circumstance is different in nature from a deontic
source, in that in deontic modality the source is assumed
to have authority over whether the action is to be carried
out whereas with dynamic modality the source or
circumstance is not linked to authority. However, in
dynamic possibility there are also examples in which there
is no such X: an action may be possible without the
possibility being linked to some single circumstance (see
section 4.1.1.).
In this thesis dynamic possibility will be seen in terms
of plans for actions. For example, in order to answer a
question like
(18) Can the painters start on the 29th?
the respondent has to find out whether there is a plan for
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the painters starting on that date and whether the
preconditions for carrying out that plan are satisfied.
Dynamic necessity will be shown to be linked to a goal or
goals of one of the participants of the discourse. Ability
will be regarded as something which can be handled under
dynamic modality, since it can be seen as one precondition
for a plan.
While a distinction will be made between deontic and
dynamic modalities, it is accepted that they are related,
and that they differ from epistemic modality in a
systematic way: deontic and dynamic modalities have
restrictions on the time reference and the nature of the
predicates; no such restrictions apply to epistemic modality.
The term 'root modality' will be used as a superordinate
term to cover both deontic and dynamic modality. The main
distinction is thus between epistemic on the one hand, and
root modality (deontic and dynamic modality), on the other.
Some main differences between the two categories are
listed below; the links and differences between them, and
whether the procedures for the two could be combined will
be discussed in detail in chapter 6.
The following are generally considered to be the main
differences between epistemic and deontic modality (cf.
Lyons 1977, Palmer 1979). Epistemic modality has to do
with propositions; it expresses whether the truth of the
proposition is possible or necessary. Deontic modality
involves actions: it expresses whether an obligation,
permission, prohibition or exemption to perform an action
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exists. Moreover, the action must be (in relation to the
modality) in the future: there cannot be an obligation, etc.,
to perform something in the past. This restriction does
not apply to the propositions of epistemic modality which
may be past, present or future. Since dynamic modality has
to do with events and actions, it differs from epistemic
modality in just the way that deontic modality does.
It has also been claimed that epistemic and deontic
modality differ in that deontic necessity "typically
proceeds, or derives, from some source or cause" (Lyons
1977: 824); i.e. from the so-called deontic source. Epistemic
necessity is thought not to be linked to a source in the
same way. However, epistemic necessity also can be
thought of as deriving from a cause in a sense: an
utterance like 'It must be raining' is based on some
argument that the speaker has in mind; this argument is
the 'cause' of the conclusion.
Leech and Coates (1980) add to these differences the
following points as evidence for the claim that there is a
clear-cut boundary between the epistemic and root senses
of the modals may and must. Firstly, they mention
syntactic/semantic criteria such as the differences in the
scope of negation between the different senses (e.g. 'He may
not go' has the senses (i) "He is not allowed to go" and (ii)
"It is possible that he will not go" - i.e. may has wide
scope with the deontic sense and narrow scope with the
epistemic sense); secondly, they claim that within root
modality, there are continua from one root sense to
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another; epistemic modality has no such continua between
senses.
A central theoretical question that is addressed in many
studies on modals is whether they are monosemantic or
polysemantic. Can a modal can be described as having a
basic meaning, of which other senses are variations, or
must the different senses be regarded as independent?
Ehrman (1966) and Perkins (1980) take the monosemantic
view. For example, the root and epistemic senses of the
modal must, as in
(21) You must close the door.
(22) It must be raining.
can in their view both be expressed in one definition, such
as "X requires that p", with the difference between the
senses lying in the nature of X (cf. Ehrman 1966: 67,
Perkins 1980: 64).
Most other studies implicitly accept the view that
modals are polysemantic (e.g. Leech 1971, Quirk et al. 1972,
Palmer 1979), although Palmer (1979) notes that the basic
meaning hypothesis has more justification with some modals
than with others. While MAY is a modal which appears to
have two distinct senses (op.cit.: 10), CAN seems to have a
basic meaning. The basic meaning of CAN would be dynamic
possibility (op.cit.: 61), given that it is possible to combine
the permission sense of CAN with its possibility sense.
Coates (1980) explains the meanings of modals in terms
of fuzzy set theory: each modal has one or more core
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meanings, and the core meanings may have a 'skirt' and a
peripheral area around them. Those uses of a modal which
do not belong to the core sense but are related to it
belong to the skirt or the periphery. For example, the
core meanings of can are "ability" and "permission" and both
of these have a skirt where the sense is that of
"possibility". Here the two skirts overlap. The aim of this
approach is to explain the "messiness" of modals; there is
frequently indeterminacy between the different senses (cf.
chapter 7).
The only studies to my knowledge that take a
procedural approach to the English modals and to modality
are Isard and Longuet-Higgins (1973) and Isard (1974). The
studies deal with conditionality and the modal verbs in the
context of playing the game of tic-tac-toe, and they give
procedural definitions of the (senses) of modal verbs that
are used in that domain. The modals included in their
program are may, must, will and can, and they are defined
in terms of possible games which are continuations from
the reference situation.
Although the definitions are both insightful and
successful in the domain of the game, they are limited in
that, with the exception of can, the sense that occurs in
this context is that of objective epistemic, or possibly
alethic modality. The definitions of may and must are
given in terms of possible games, that is, whether p is
true in some or every possible game, which is exactly
parallel to the definition of the logical modal operators
1 ?.
POSSIBLE and NECESSARY. Will and can obviously have no
equivalent in logical modality; however, they occur in a
very neutral or objective sense in the context. Can is the
only one that expresses root modality. Their procedure for
can involves looking for a strategy for carrying out the
action given in the proposition (their definition of can will
be discussed in chapter 4).
The research done for this thesis can be seen as a
continuation of the approach taken by Isard and
Longuet-Higgins. The proposals that will be made here for
dealing with can are built on their work: defining dynamic
possibility of actions in terms of plans for those actions is
close to Isard and Longuet-Higgins' definition of can in
terms of strategies. However, a different range of
modality will be covered here. Their program does not
cover the kind of circumstantial modality that may depend
on the interlocutors' goals. The definitions of can and
must proposed here will therefore be different from theirs.
1.3. Lvons (1977): Semantics (Chapter 17)
Lyons (1977: Chapter 17) represents a different approach
to modality from what has been adopted in this thesis. As
it is an important contribution, it will be reviewed here in
some detail in order to see how it is located relative to
the framework chosen here, and also because Lyons explores
areas like the contrast between root and epistemic
modality, which will be discussed in the later chapters of
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this thesis.
Lyons' discussion of modality is based on his tripartite
analysis of the logical structure of utterances in general.
This system is adopted from Hare (1970): the three
components are the phrastic, the tropic and the neustic.
The phrastic is the propositional content of the sentence.
The tropic expresses what kind of speech act the sentence
is characteristically used to perform. The neustic
expresses to what extent the speaker is committed to the
factuality or desirability of what is expressed in the
propositional content of the sentence (Lyons 1977: 749).
For example, statements are described as follows: "I say so
(neustic) - it is so (tropic) - that p (phrastic)"; yes-no
questions as "I don't know - it is so - that p"; and
commands as "I say so - let it be so - that p". Lyons uses
symbols to express the values that the neustic and the
tropic may take: . stands for unmarked neustic and tropic, ?
for questions, and ! for mands. By using these symbols, the
structure of a statement is ". . p", that of a yes-no
question "? . p" and that of a mand ". ! p". A request is
analysed as "? ! p".
In connection with modality this tripartite system is
used to explain the differences between subjective and
objective modality, and the affinity of subjective deontic
modality to mands.
Both epistemic and deontic modality are divided into
subjective and objective categories. If the utterance (e.g.
'Alfred must be unmarried') contains subjective epistemic
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modality, the assessment of the truth of p is the speaker's
subjective view; if objective epistemic, the possibility or
necessity of p is an objective fact. Lyons claims that this
distinction can be made in theory, even if not always in
practice.
But if it is intended that the objective sense of for
example 'Alfred must be unmarried' is the result of
objective, logical reasoning, (cf. Lyons 1977: 798), it could
equally well be used as an example of alethic modality, and
it is not quite clear what the difference between alethic
and objective epistemic is. The problematic status of
objective epistemic modality is acknowledged by Lyons when
he admits that it lies between alethic modality and
subjective epistemic modality, "and might be assimilated to
either" (op.cit.: 798).
Subjective epistemic modality is analysed as having a
qualified neustic, i.e. the speaker's commitment to the truth
of p is qualified: the neustic is "I think it possible" instead
of "I say so"; in objective epistemic modality the neustic
expresses commitment but the tropic is qualified.
Subjective is thus "poss . p" and objective ". poss p",
although Lyons also allows the possibility of having the
modality in the phrastic, as part of the propositional
content: ". . poss(p)".
It would seem that, certainly from the hearer's point of
view (Lyons' analysis seems to be from the speaker's
viewpoint), there is perhaps a scale in epistemic modality
in that the hearer may assess the comment of the speaker
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about the factuality of p to be more or less subjective.
This assessment may be made on such grounds as the role
of the speaker and how much the hearer thinks the speaker
knows about the subject (cf. Lyons' (1977: 799) example 'It
may be raining in London' as said by a meteorologist or by
a layman). But there is a clear boundary between epistemic
and logical modality, as Karttunen (1972) has shown (see
section 4.3.1.).
The difference between objective and subjective deontic
modality is that in the subjective case the deontic source
is the speaker; in the objective case it is something or
somebody other than the speaker. Lyons considers the
possibility of analysing subjective deontic necessity as
". ! p". This would make the semantic structure of
modalised statements like 'You must open the door.'
identical to that of commands, e.g. 'Open the door!', and,
inevitably, Lyons concludes that these are not identical
semantically and that in modalised statements the
obligation has to be part of the phrastic. He proposes
analysing the modalised statement as ! that !p exists"
(Lyons 1977: 840). In other words, 'You must open the door'
is an assertion which expresses the existence of an
obligation, but it also expresses the illocutionary force of
a mand.
Permission, prohibition, and exemption are analysed in
the same way, as assertions expressing the existence of a
permission, etc., using negation of either the modality or
the main predication to achieve the desired description
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(these are based on the relationship of possibility and
necessity through negation: nec p = poss p;
poss p = ~ nec «« p; (Lyons 1977: 789, 840):
You may open the door. ! that ^!p not exist"
You needn't open the door. ". ! that !p not exist"
You must not open the door. ". ! that ~!p exist"
The difference between objective and subjective deontic
modality is that in the objective case the tropic is
unqualified, "it is so" rather than "it be so". Lyons at
first gives the structure "I say so - it is so - that X
obligates (permits) p" (p. 834). However, he later expresses
doubt as to whether the ambiguity between subjective and
objective deontic modality really is a linguistic ambiguity
at all; and whether all deontic statements should in fact
be analysed as having the primary illocutionary force of
precisely statements (p. 841). But, to sum up the theory as
it is presented, the difference between subjective and
objective deontic modality is whether the tropic is . or !.
The primary structures in natural language, at least in
English, are "poss . p" (subjective epistemic possibility) and
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". ! p" (subjective deontic necessity) (p. 8 4 5).
It is not clear whether he intends the
subjective/objective modality dichotomy to be applied to
modalised questions, or whether questions are neutral as to
subjectivity/ objectivity. It is difficult to see how this
distinction could apply to questions. The first difficulty is
that the subjectivity or otherwise cannot apply to the
1 7
speaker's (= questioner's) utterance (he is asking for the
hearer's response). The second difficulty is that, if the
subjectivity or objectivity is thought to apply to the
expected answer, the questioner may be asking the question
without any presumption as to who or what the deontic
source is, or whether something is the respondent's view or
an objective view.
The central feature of Lyons' analysis is that it
attributes the differences between modalities partly to the
propositional content and partly to the illocutionary
component of utterances. By contrast, the procedures for
modality proposed in this study do not include illocutionary
force at all, although they do make use of both semantic
and pragmatic concepts. The pragmatic notions that have
to be accounted for, e.g. the intentions behind utterances,
are richer than what can be included in the tripartite
system proposed by Lyons. The system proposed here
includes one of these pragmatic concepts, the goals of the
interlocutors, including both the general, non-linguistic
goals as well as conversational goals.
It seems clear that any utterance has to be labelled as
to its function, that is, whether it is a statement, a
question or a mand. This labelling can be seen as part of
the semantic level and as the result of a direct mapping
from the syntactic structure (declarative, interrogative and
imperative sentences) (cf. Leech 1983: 1 14). When an
utterance is used indirectly to convey some other
illocutionary force in addition to these, pragmatic
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principles (principles of conversation, general
problem-solving methods, knowledge about the world and
about people's behaviour) have to be applied.
This study differs form Lyons' in its approach and to
some extent in the range of modalities it covers. Lyons
gives a logical analysis of utterances including propositional
and speech act elements; this study attempts to find
procedures that would deal with modalised questions and
answers. Lyons' treatment covers alethic, epistemic and
deontic modalities and draws a distinction between
subjective and objective modality in the latter two. This
thesis will cover subjective epistemic modality (but not
objective epistemic or alethic modalities) and subjective and
objective deontic modality, in the senses that Lyons uses
these terms. The main concern here will be dynamic
modality (not discussed by Lyons).
1.4. Procedural semantics
As the approach taken in this study, procedural
semantics, differs from that of most other studies on the
semantics of modals, this section aims to clarify what it is
and what its methods and advantages are.
Procedural semantics defines meanings in the form of
algorithms. The method typically used by advocates of this
form of semantics is to incorporate these algorithms in a
natural language question-answering program; in this way it
is possible to test whether they work in practice and so
1 9
establish whether they are at least possible candidates for
defining the meanings of given expressions. This approach
offers several other advantages for semantic investigation.
It forces the investigator to develop the proposals in
detail and prevents possible oversights in the application
of rules. It prevents one from developing over-complicated
theories or theories which shift difficulties into other
areas, which are themselves often unsolved. It also forces
one to consider the analysis of utterances both from the
speaker's and the hearer's point of view, rather than purely
abstractly; for example, phenomena like ambiguity, or
determining what goals are relevant in the context, are
different from the two view points. At the same time it
shows what is common in production and comprehension. All
these advantages derive from the concreteness and
explicitness of the approach.
The procedural approach sees language as goal-oriented,
functional behaviour. Both semantics and pragmatics have
to be brought in, but it is still possible to make a
distinction between what belongs to each sphere, e.g. what
part of the meaning of a modal has to be general,
applicable to all contexts, and what has to be derived form
the context in which the utterance is spoken. For example,
the procedure that answers dynamically modalised questions
takes into account the goals that the interlocutors may
have, since the degree of modality often depends on such
goals. This is part of the general procedure for the
semantics of dynamic modality. However, finding what the
20
goal or goals are in a particular context has to be done by
using pragmatic principles.
The most important feature of the procedural approach
is of course that it enables one to test whether the
theory developed can be made to work in practice. It also
gives new perspectives on other people's theories: in this
case, on theories about the semantics of modals, such as
the question of whether modals are monosemantic or
polysemantic.
One of the conclusions drawn in this thesis is that
neither the strictly monosemantic nor the strictly
polysemantic view of the modals is helpful as a basis for a
procedural account of the modals. It will be shown, on the
one hand, that there is a high-level similarity between
dynamic and epistemic modality (a similarity which may even
be shared by alethic modality). On the other hand, there
are important distinctions between epistemic modality and
root modality (including dynamic modality). These
differences emerge with clarity because of the explicitness
required for the procedural treatment. They lead to the
conclusion that separate procedures are needed for dealing
with epistemic modality and with root modality; however,
it will be proposed that the epistemic procedure should
have access to and be able to use the root modality
procedure as part of its inference making process when
appropriate (but not vice versa).
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1.5. Organisation of thesis
The organisation of the rest of this thesis is as
follows: Chapter 2 is an outline of the system proposed for
handling modalised questions. Chapter 3 introduces the
pragmatic concepts that will be employed in the proposed
system. Chapters 4 and 5 give a detailed account of the
dynamic and deontic modalities and the procedures
developed for handling them. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the
relation of epistemic modality to root modalities and the
question of to what extent modals can be said to be mono-
or polysemantic. A discussion of the relationship of
semantics and pragmatics in the procedures for modals is
also included in chapter 7.
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2. THE DOMAIN OF DISCOURSE AND AN OUTLINE
OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
2.1. The domain of house construction
In order to be able to investigate what the procedures
for the modals should be, a restricted domain of discourse
was chosen for the study.
The domain is that of a schedule for the construction of
a house. The construction process involves a number of
jobs, which have to be done in a certain order. The
duration time of each job is known beforehand. The jobs,
their immediate predecessors and their duration times
1
chosen as an example are given in Figure 1.
On the basis of the information given in Figure 1 it is
possible to construct a network (Figure 2), which shows the
sequence of jobs, and given that the goal is to finish the
house in the shortest possible time, the time for the
earliest and latest possible starting times for each job can
be calculated.
For some jobs there is a margin; for instance job k could
be started any time between day 25, which is the shortest
time required to complete all the jobs that have to
precede job k (day 25 = its earliest starting time), and day
27, which is got by subtracting the durations of all the
jobs that follow job k from the finishing time
(day 27 = the latest starting time of job k).
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Job Immediate Time
Name Description Predecessors Cdavs)
a Excavate — 4
b Pour concrete foundations a 2
c Erect frame and roof b 4
d Lay brick work c 6
e Install drains b 1
f Pour basement floor e 2
g Install rough plumbing e 3
h Install rough wiring c 2
i Fasten plasterboards and plaster 9, h 10
j Lay flooring i, f 3
k Finish plumbing j 2
1 Joinery j 3
m Finish roofing d 2
n Paint k, 1 3
o Finish electrical work n 1





Figure2:Ho sconst uction:seq ncefj bs Thenumberswithint nodesref rtdurationti sft ej bquestion e=arlieststartingtime 1=lateststartingtime Doublelinearcsmarkthc iticalp th
For some jobs the earliest and latest starting times are
the same, that is, there is only one possible starting time.
These jobs form a path in the network, which is called the
critical path. No job which is on the critical path can be
delayed without delaying the completion of the house.
(Critical path problems are a well-known type of problem
to computer and management scientists. There are
programming methods to find out the earliest and latest
starting times for each job and to find the critical path,
given the information about immediate predecessors and
duration times for each job.)
Assuming that we had an 'expert' or a system that had
all the information given in the network described above
and which could answer questions about scheduling the
construction work, one could ask the system questions like
the following:
(1) When can the plumbers start the rough
plumbing?
(2) Can the plasterers start on the 9th?
(3) When should the painters start?
(4) Must the painters start on the 28th?
2
Examples of the system's answers would be :
(A1) a. They can start on the 7th.
b. They can start between the 7th and
the 9th.
(A2) a. Yes.
b. No, because the plumbers haven't finished
by then.
c. No, if the house is to be finished
by day 32.
d. Yes, in fact they must start then.
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(A3) a. They should start on day 28.
(A4) a. No, they can start between the 26th and
the 28th.
b. No, they can also start on the 27th.
c. Yes, they must.
The only constraint on the schedule in this simplified
network are the order of jobs and the time constraints.
Other parameters one might want to add are for example
availability of workmen at certain times, supplies of
materials, and so on. If constraints like this are taken
into account, a question like
(5) Can the bricklayers start on the 12th?
could be understood as a query about whether they can
from the point of view of the time network for the
completion of the house, or whether they have a free slot
in their diary, or whether the bricks will have been
delivered by then.
The questions and answers one gets in this domain
illustrate dynamic modality. They also illustrate the way
in which dynamically modalised questions and responses are
often interpreted as being about possibility or necessity in
relation to some specific point of view (cf. Austin 1961,
Kratzer 1977, Cresswell 1 979). This and other pragmatic
problems will be discussed in the next chapter.
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2.2. The example program
The example program can answer questions like the
following:
(6) Can the painters start on day 6?
(7) Must the painters start on day 6?
(8) When can the painters start?
(9) When must the painters start?
The program is written in Prolog and consists of a
parser, a planner, a database for the planner, and routines
for determining the possibility or necessity of an action
and for giving the result as an appropriately formulated
answer to the question asked by the user. The last
mentioned component, the analyser of the degree of
modality for the proposed action, is the most important
part of the program. The function of both the parser and
the planner is to serve as tools for the analyser, and they
are not necessarily the ideal ones for this domain.
This section gives an overall view of how the example
program and its components work. There is a listing of the
program and more detailed notes in the Appendix.
2.2.1. The parser
The parser can deal with sentences like
(6) Can the painters start on day 6?
(7) Must the painters start on day 6?
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(8) When can the painters start?
(9) When must the painters start?
(10) The painters can start on day 6.
(11) The painters must start on day 6.
(12) Can't the painters start on day 6?
The parser takes the input sentence and produces a
simple semantic representation (SR); for example,
Sentence: Can the painters start on day 6?
SR: question(yesno, can(starttime(painters,6)))
(The sentence is yes-no question and the propositional
content is expressed in a simplified form,
"can(starttime(painters,6))"f which is adequate for the
present purposes. The meaning of can is represented as
"can" and the meaning of must as "must" in the SRs; they
could be represented as "feasible" and "necessary"; cf.
section 7.2.)
The aim in writing the parser was to analyse as
accurately as possible verb phrases containing present
tense modal auxiliaries. All other areas of syntax and
semantics are dealt with as simply as possible, extracting
only the minimum information necessary in the specific
domain.
The framework for the parser is that of definite clause
grammars, and it is written using the method described in
Pereira and Warren (1980: 252-253), which produces a
semantic representation as its output. The semantic
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representation is built up from the SRs of the constituents:
as the parser processes each constituent it assigns it a SR;
these SRs are passed on to the left hand sides of rules and
thus eventually to the top level.
The present parser also produces other information
about the input sentence: it has a rudimentary system of
assigning some constituent as a discourse focus of the
sentence. This facility is needed especially when answering
questions. For example, in the question
(13) Can the painters come on day 6?
the focus might be either 'the painters' or 'on day 6', and
the respective answers would accordingly be different:
(A13) a. No, but the electricians can come then,
b. No, but they can come on day 7.
In reality, determining what is in focus depends to a large
extent on the pragmatic context and the intentions of the
interlocutors. The problem of focus will be discussed in
chapter 3.
In the present program, the focus is always given; the
system does not in any sense deduce it from the linguistic
or the extralinguistic context. The focus is assumed to be
the time adverbial unless otherwise indicated (in which
case it must be indicated by a special symbol in the input
question).
The output of the parser is then the semantic
representation together with an indication of what is in
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focus; and the focus is either the time or a marked
element.
The grammar used in the parser is a phrase structure
grammar based on ideas drawn from Gazdar, Pullum and Sag
(1982). In the process of adapting the fragment of grammar
which was needed to process the modals and the sentence
types relevant in the restricted domain, it was expanded
and modified considerably. In order to make the grammar
more concise and the parser more efficient, the grammar
was changed from a context-free to a context-sensitive
grammar.
The parser can handle both narrow and wide scope
negation in declarative as well as interrogative sentences.
If requested, it will output all possible readings of a
negated sentence. However, the system as a whole cannot
answer negated questions; because of restrictions of the
Prolog language and of the planner, this was not attempted.
Details of the parser are explained in the Appendix.
2.2.2. The planner
A program that attempts to answer questions containing
modals needs a planner. The general purpose planner
WARPLAN, written by Warren (1974) was used here to
demonstrate the responses that are needed from the
planner. However, it is the interface between the output
(the SR of the proposition) given by the parser, and the
planner that defines the meaning of modals like can and
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must. If this interface is not independent from the domain
and from the planner, it loses its generality: it is no
longer a general definition of can or must but of can or
must in a specific domain.
3
WARPLAN is a STRIPS-like planner , which has operators,
preconditions, delete lists and add lists. The operators
correspond to actions and the preconditions are conditions
which have to be true before the action can take place.
The delete and add lists represent the effects of the
operators when they are applied to states of the world.
Operators may require the action of other operators to
achieve their preconditions.
The main difference between STRIPS and WARPLAN is that,
unlike STRIPS, WARPLAN is complete in the sense that in
theory it will find a solution to any solvable problem. But
WARPLAN is not very efficient, which limits its application
in many practical cases. (For differences between STRIPS
and WARPLAN see Warren 19 74.) From the point of view of
efficiency WARPLAN is not the ideal planner for the house
construction domain. Better efficiency would be achieved
by incorporating into the planner a special purpose critical
path algorithm. Such a procedure was used at an early
stage of this research but it was not incorporated in the
general planner as this is a technical problem which does
not affect the linguistic issues. The example program uses
the planner for demonstration purposes rather than to find
efficient solutions to particular problems.
The example program was run using the example below,
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which is much simpler than the one given in section 2.1. for
the critical path network.
2.2.3. The database
The database contains the facts about the world that
the planner needs, in this case facts about house
construction, and the operators and preconditions that are
relevant.
As all the questions that are allowed have to do with
finding a time when particular tradesmen can start a
particular job, the only operator that is needed is
'fixstart', which tries to find a starting time for given job.
The example that is given in the Appendix and which
was used for demonstration has the simplest possible
configuration in that we have only a few jobs and the jobs
follow each other (i.e. each job has only one predecessor).
The time for the beginning of the work is given; the
starting times for the actual jobs are not fixed. The
predecessor and the duration of each job is defined in the
database.
The precondition for the operator 'fixstart' defines the
computation for finding out whether a given time T is a
possible starting time for a job J. This involves looking at
the starting time of the predecessor of J and checking
what the duration of the predecessor is. If the starting
time of the predecessor of J is not known, the planner has
to find that out first.
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2.2.4. Determining whether an action is feasible or
necessary
The example program has a routine for analysing the
feasibility or necessity of an action. This routine is called
when an answer is needed for questions containing can or
must, e.g.
(6) Can the painters start on day 6?
(7) Must the painters start on day 6?
It takes as input the semantic representation of the
question, uses the planner to test the feasibility of the
action, and produces an appropriate response. The
feasibility of the action is tested by consulting the
schedule for the construction, and it is related to the goal
of finishing the house by an agreed date. Thus examples (6)
and (7) might get answers like
(A6) a. Yes, they can.
b. No, they can't if the goal is to be met.
(A7) Yes, they must if the goal is to be met.
This routine is the most important part of the program as
well as the central part of this study, and it is described
in detail in chapter four.
This program produces answers to dynamically modalised
questions. It illustrates the process of interpreting the
question and of producing a relevant answer. In this
process the pragmatic concepts of the focus of a question
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and the understood higher level goal of the interlocutors
(finishing the house by a certain date), to which the
modality relates, are taken into account. To some extent
the program illustrates both the understanding and the
4
production of modalised utterances.
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3. PRAGMATIC PROBLEMS
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and to
discuss two pragmatic problems that are encountered in and
highlighted by a natural language question-answering
system. These are the focus of the question, on the one
hand, and the goals and intentions of the interlocutors, on
the other, and the effects that these have on the
production of answers to questions. It should be
emphasized that both of these are general phenomena that
have to be tackled in order to get a question-answer
program to function satisfactorily; they are not restricted
to the study of modals nor to the domain or framework
chosen here.
Both of these notions will be used in the program
developed here for dealing with modalised questions not
only to make an answer more relevant to the interlocutor
by recognising his conversational and his ulterior goals; but
they will also be used in the actual procedure that
determines the degree of modality. The focus of the
question will be used to define a set of alternative worlds:
this is necessary for establishing whether the proposed
action is necessary or not (see chapter 4). The general,
non-linguistic, goals of the interlocutors are important for
dealing with dynamic modality and it will be shown that
dynamic necessity is always and that other degrees of
dynamic modality are sometimes linked to such a goal.
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The focus of the question will be dealt with first:
there is a preliminary section to set out the problems, and
after that, a description and a discussion of some views of
focus in questions in the literature. This is followed by a
review of a discussion of how the interlocutors' general
goals affect the answering process. We will then return
to discuss these phenomena in the domain of this study.
3.1. The focus of the question
A direct can-question is very often a preliminary for
arranging something, as it is in the following example.
(1) User: Can the painters start on the 29th?
System: Yes.
Yes, in fact they must if the house
is to be finished on time.
No, they cannot if the house is to
be finished on time.
When the answer to this type of question is affirmative, it
is followed by the interlocutors agreeing to the
arrangement.
In example (1) the role of the system is to give expert
advice on scheduling. The system knows that the user has
an overall goal of finishing the construction of the house
by some time X and the question is interpreted in the
sense "Is p possible in view of the goal of completing the
house by X?". (This is of course only one possible
interpretation of the question. In another situation, it
may be intended/interpreted as relating to some other
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goal.) In order to give a meaningful, relevant answer the
goal has to be taken into account in the procedure that
produces the answer.
We will assume that the illocutionary force of the user's
utterance in (1) is that of question, i.e. a request for
information (rather than a request for action). In asking
the question, the user has an immediate goal of either (i)
fixing a time for the painters to start work, or (ii) fixing
for somebody (not necessarily the painters) to start work
on the 29th.
We will use the term 'focus of the question' to refer to
the element in the question that the questioner's interest
is focused upon. If the questioner's immediate goal is (i)
fixing a time for the painters, then the time (the 29th) is
the focus of the question. If the questioner's immediate
goal is (ii) fixing for (any) job to be started on the 29th,
then the focus of the question is the description of the
job (here described by referring to the tradesmen in
question, the painters). Possible helpful answers would be
different depending on what is taken to be in focus:
(i) No, but they can start on the 30th.
(ii) No, but the electricians can come then.
This kind of helpful answers are based on the
conversational principle of cooperation (Grice 1975). The
concept of the focus of a question is related to the
conversational goal of the questioner, and in trying to find
it and answer appropriately the respondent is trying to
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make his contribution relevant. Leech (1983) indeed
redefines Grice's "Be relevant" maxim in terms of the
interlocutors' conversational goals:
"An utterance U is relevant to a speech situation
to the extent that U can be interpreted
as contributing to the conversational goal(s) of
[the speaker] or [the hearer]." (Leech 1983: 99)
The program for modalised questions uses both the
overall goal of the user (= finishing the house by a given
time), and the focus of the question, which is related to
the immediate (conversational) goal of the user in his
asking the question. The immediate goal is a subgoal of
the overall goal.
To consider a different example, in
(2) A: I've got to go to Glasgow tomorrow.
Can you drive me to the station
tomorrow morning?
B: a. Yes, I can do that.
b. No, I can't because [...] . You'll
have to go by bus.
c. I suppose I'll have to (because the
busdrivers are on strike).
the roles of A and B might be husband and wife; A's goal is
to get to Glasgow the following day, and a subgoal of that
is for him to get to the station in the morning. The
former is spelled out and the latter can be inferred by the
hearer, the inference being based on both the information
given in the utterance and the hearer's knowledge about
ways of travelling and what they involve. The illocutionary
force in this case is that of a request (for action) , and
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the immediate goal is of course the action requested,
namely to get B to drive A to the station.
This example shows that the focus of the question need
not be one single constituent, but may be a larger part of
the proposition. If B cannot drive A to the station and
wants to give a helpful, suggestive answer, B may check 'B's
driving A to the station' against some other way of getting
A to the station (cf. answer (2b)). So the focus would seem
to be 'you drive me'.
In a different context, however, 'Can you drive me to
the station tomorrow morning?' could have the focus on
some other part of the proposition. For example, if
A wants to go to the station for train spotting some time
(but it does not have to be tomorrow), the focus is on the
time, and it would be appropriate to answer 'No, but I
could take you on Friday afternoon'; but this would not be
an appropriate answer to the question in (2).
In this example, knowing the questioner's goal may help
to restrict the set of what might be in focus. However,
the focus cannot always be predicted even when the goal is
known. In example (1), where the goal is the finishing of
the house at time X, the focus may still be either the job
or the time.
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3.2. Focus in questions: related work
This section reviews how the 'focus of a question' has
been understood and treated by different scholars.
According to Quirk et al. (1972: 388) focussing is marked
by placing the nuclear stress on the chosen item in the
sentence. In the case of yes-no questions the constituent
focussed upon refers to an item of information which is
unknown to the questioner (unlike the rest of the
sentence). They give these examples:
(3) a. Was he a famous actor in 'those days?
("I know he was a famous actor -
but was it then or later?")
b. Was he a 'famous actor in those days?
("I know he was an actor in those days -
but was he a famous one?")
These questions are identical except that the focus falls on
different elements, but this difference means that the
addressee is asked to consider different aspects in each
case.
Quirk et al. also claim that in order to avoid the
difficulty in locating the focus of the question, one of the
following strategies is generally used. Yes-no questions
are either (a) kept short, introducing one factor at a time,
e.g.
(4) Is this the room?
(5) Did anyone search it?
(6) Was it John?
(7) Did he do it carefully?
4 1
or (b) they are made unambiguous by grammatical and/or
prosodic focussing, e.g.
(8) Is 'this the room that 'John searched
carefully?
(9) Did John search 'this room carefully?
or (c) they are presumed to question the predication as a
whole:
(10) Did John search the room?
or (d) they are presumed to question the last element of
the sentence:
(11) Did John search the room carefully?
(Quirk et al. 1972: 53). (The viewpoint in this description
seems to shift from the speaker (cases a-b) to the hearer
(cases c-d).)
Except for the case in which the whole predication is
questioned, the claim is that in questions containing
several elements the focus is on the last element, unless
some other element is marked as focus by grammatical
means (example 8) or by stress and pitch (example 9).
Although Quirk et al. refer to 'nuclear' stress being
placed on the focussed item, the phenomenon in examples
(3a~3b) and (8-9) seems to come close to contrastive stress.
These examples contain devices that are often used for
expressing contrastiveness: marked stress/pitch and cleft
sentences (cf. Chafe 1976: 34-37).
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One could perhaps summarise the view of Quirk et al. by-
saying that unless there is contrastive focus on some
element in the question, then the question is either about
the predication as a whole, or about the last element in
the question.
It is true that there are modalised questions as well
that question the whole predication, e.g.
(12) Can John search the room?
(13) Can the police search the house?
(permission sense)
(14) Need the police search the house?
But with examples like
(1) Can the painters start on the 29th?
Quirk et al. would argue that if the speaker is interested
in the painters, a contrastive stress will be placed on the
word painters.
It is noteworthy about the examples given by Quirk et
al. that (5) differs from all the rest in the following way:
an affirmative answer to all the other questions (3-4, 6-11)
would be 'Yes' only; an answer to
(5') Did anyone search the room?
could also give the information who it was:
Yes, John did.
Winograd (1972: 139-140) deals with this type of
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question, in which the item in focus is an indefinite noun
phrase. In his example
(15) Does the box contain a block?
'a block' is the element is focus. He claims that it is the
grammatical fact that 'a block' is an indefinite NP that
marks it as the focus of the question and which the hearer
uses as a clue to find the focus. An indefinite NP
represents an unknown element, and even if a mere 'Yes' or
'No' would be an adequate answer, Winograd's program
operates on the assumption that since the questioner is
interested in 'a block' or 'blocks' which are in the box, he
is probably interested in being able to identify the
unknown block or blocks if such are found. Thus the
program might answer
(16) Yes, two of them: a red one and a green one.
(Winograd 1972: 140). This strategy of identifying the focus
with an indefinite NP (if there is one in the sentence) and
construing the question as asking for a value for the
indefinite element, works well in the domain of the 'blocks
world', and if there is no special emphasis on any element.
However, a question with an indefinite NP but also with
a root modal, such as
(17) Can you put a block in the box?
(18) Can you get a painter for the 29th?
turns out to be less straightforward. Although these too
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can be answered by 'Yes, the red one.' or 'Yes, I can get Mr
Duncan.', it is possible to construe these examples in such a
way that the questioner is not asking for a value to be
supplied for the indefinite NP, but is only asking whether
the addressee is capable of performing the action (or, in
the impersonal interpretation of (17), whether the action is
feasible, performed by any human agent). (17) and (18) can
also be interpreted as requests for action, in which case
the questioner is asking the addressee to perform the
action, but again is not necessarily interested in finding an
identity for the NP. If this is true, then Winograd's
procedure of interpreting the indefinite NP as focus does
not work in all cases.
Winograd claims that in question (15) 'the box' cannot be
in focus because 'the box' would not be a meaningful answer
to question (15). This seems to be saying that an element
can only be in focus if it can occur in the response. This
need not be the case. 'The box' may be in focus, but the
reason why it cannot occur in the answer is that it refers
to a known entity (repeating it would not add any
information), whereas if 'a block' is in focus, the identity
of the entity is not known and can be given in the
response.
It is certainly possible to place contrastive focus on
any other element in question (15), e.g.
(15') Does the 'box contain a block?
(as opposed to the basket)
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(15'') Does the box con'tain a block?
(as opposed to there being a block next
to it)
Winograd also discusses some other syntactic devices as
clues to what is in focus.
It seems that Winograd's concept of focus is different
both from what Quirk et al. refer to when they talk about
the focus of a question (they are primarily interested in
the functions of syntactic and intonational phenomena), and
from what the focus of the question is taken to be in this
study. Winograd's view of focus is probably determined by
the limited domain and language but it is too restricted
since in that view focus can only fall on indefinite NPs. It
restricts focus only to questions asking about the
existence of an entity with a particular property. These
questions are different from other yes-no questions in that
they can be construed as wh-questions: they sometimes
expect the addressee not only to respond with 'Yes' or 'No'
but also to supply a value for the indefinite expression
(Lyons 1977: 759). This is what Winograd's program does: it
treats these questions in the same way as it treats
wh-questions.
The term 'focus' has also been used by researchers in
artificial intelligence to describe a discourse phenomenon.
Grosz (1978, 1979) uses the term 'focussing' in the
following sense: participants of a discourse focus or
concentrate their attention on a small portion of what
each of them knows or believes; entities that are central
to the dialogue at a given point are the ones that are
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focussed upon. Focussing is an active process both on the
part of the speaker and on the part of the hearer. The
speaker provides clues as to what he is going to focus on
next; these clues may be linguistic or they may be
derivable from the non-linguistic context. For
communication to succeed, one has to assume that at any
given time both the speaker and the hearer are focussing
on the same thing(s) (Grosz 1979: 84).
Grosz' studies examine the relationship between
focussing and definite descriptions. Focussing is shown to
be an important factor both in interpreting and in
generating definite descriptions. As a mechanism that
separates those items that are currently highlighted (from
all other possible ones), focussing limits the set of entities
from which the entity referred to must be identified (Grosz
1979: 91).
The data for Grosz' study is task-oriented dialogues.
One of the participants of the dialogue is an apprentice
whose task it is, for instance, to assemble or disassemble a
piece of machinery, and the other one is an expert on that
subject, giving advice to the apprentice. Grosz shows how
the task at hand affects focussing. She shows how the
structure of the mutually known part of the plan tree (for
the task) determines what is in focus, and she relates
movement to different subproblems in this tree to shifts in
focus.
Grosz has shown that focussing is one of the mechanisms
that are needed for finding referents for definite
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descriptions and for generating definite descriptions in such
a way that the referents are identifiable by the hearer.
However, the important question of how a shift in focus is
indicated or understood in general, or for example in other,
less well structured domains, remains largely open. The
only clue discussed in her work is the structure of the
task. It is possible that there are other means that are
used in determining focus (Grosz 1979: 98).
Kaplan (1 97 9) discusses focus in connection with
'suggestive responses': these are responses that give some
additional information (in addition to the minimum yes/no
response) that the respondent thinks may be relevant to
the questioner. For example,
(19) A: Is there a mailbox on this block?
B: No, but there is one down the street.
The suggestive response is usually a response to a related,
modified question (Kaplan 1979: 35; cf.also Allen & Perrault
1980, discussed below). The modified question is a result of
varying or eliminating the focus of the original question.
For Kaplan, focus is
"roughly speaking, [...] that aspect of the
question that is most likely to shift in a
follow-up question" (Kaplan 1979: 35).
Determining what is in focus in a question involves plan
inference (Kaplan 1979: 39). (Plan inference has been
investigated by Allen & Perrault (1980), which is discussed
below.)
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Discourse focus in this sense has also been investigated
by Sidner (1979), who discusses its role in definite anaphora
comprehension.
3.3. The goals of the interlocutors
It must first be made clear in what sense the phrase
'the speaker's intentions' or 'the speaker's goals' is used
here.
Intentions are often discussed in the context of speech
act theory. In uttering a sentence, it is the speaker's
intention to get the hearer to recognise that a particular
speech act is intended (i.e. its illocutionary force), or, to
quote Searle (1969: 45), "the speaker intends to produce a
certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognise
his intention to produce that effect".
By his analysis, in saying
(20) Are you coming to the party tomorrow?
the speaker intends the hearer to recognise that the
speaker has the intention of getting the hearer to supply
the information whether the hearer is coming to the party
the following day.
However, even if our example
(1) Can the painters start on the 29th?
can obviously be analysed in the same way as (20), the
intention or the goal of the speaker that the hearer needs
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to know in order to provide the answer for the question
(e.g. finishing the house by X) has nothing to do with the
illocutionary force of the utterance or the intention to
make the hearer recognise that illocutionary force. Rather,
we are talking about some general, non-linguistic goal that
the speaker may have and which the hearer may either
know or believe or infer that the speaker has or may have.
This is the sense in which the word 'goal' will be used in
this study.
Allen and Perrault (1980) describe a natural language
program that takes external goals into account. They show
how recognising the interlocutor's plan is used in giving a
helpful response in question-answer dialogues.
In their example situation the participants of the
dialogue are the clerk at the information desk at a railway
station, and the customer who is asking for information.
The approach is that of an artificial intelligence natural
language question-answering system; the system takes the
part of the information clerk.
When answering a question like
(21) When does the train to Windsor leave?
(uttered at the information desk in Toronto)
the system responds helpfully by giving both the time and
the platform:
(22) 1600 at gate 7.
This answer is based on inferences made from the question
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itself, (implicitly) from the role of the speaker and the
hearer, and about the speaker's (user's) possible intentions.
The system tries to reconstruct a plan that the user is
likely to want to realise, and then see if there are any
obstacles to the carrying out of this plan, and if so, it
tries to take these into account in its response. With the
above question it proceeds in the following way:
It first discovers that this is more likely to be a
question linked to boarding a train rather than meeting a
train. These are the only two actions the program knows
about; the choice of these particular actions as possible
actions to be considered is of course linked to the role of
the questioner, i.e. the customer requesting information,
which at a railway information desk is likely to be about
boarding or meeting trains (but not, for example, about
arranging drivers' shifts or about putting on extra trains);
thus the roles of the clerk and the customer limits the
search for the possible intentions of the user. This is
implicit in the program but not discussed in the article by
Allen and Perrault.
The assumption that (21) is more likely to be about
boarding a train than meeting one is made by matching the
question with the plans for boarding and for meeting trains
and discovering how much it has in common with each of
these. To describe the process in a very much simplified
way, it is done on the basis that the question is about a
(remote) destination and a departure time for that
destination, rather than about arrival time at the station
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that the interlocutors are at. (The hypothesis as to which
one is the intended plan in fact goes through several
stages, with various rating heuristics applied to it.)
'The train' in example (21) is taken to mean "the next
train" (although, depending on the context, it could
obviously refer to other things), and such a train is
searched for and found, and its departure time recorded.
The program now works on the assumption that the
hearer's plan is to board the next train to Windsor and
that he wants the information as to when it leaves.
The next step that the program takes, however, is to
check that there are no (other) obstacles for the customer
in carrying out his plan. It discovers that the plan for
boarding the train has the precondition that the agent be
at the departure location (platform) of the train at the
right time; unless the customer knows which platform to go
to, this will be an obstacle to his plan. Once this obstacle
has been detected, the program therefore informs the
customer about the platform as well as the time, so
removing the obstacle.
Allen and Perrault (1980) also show how the plan
inference and obstacle detection mechanism can deal with
providing helpful answers to yes-no questions. To a yes-no
question answered 'No', e.g.
(23) Does the Windsor train leave at 4?
a mere 'No' would be considered an unhelpful answer. What
the customer would expect would be the time the train
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does leave, e.g.
(24) No, it leaves at 4.30.
When a person asks about the truth of some proposition,in
the case that that proposition is false, the person is often
interested in a related, true proposition (Allen & Perrault
1980: 168: cf. also Kaplan 1979: 35).
3.4. Focus and goals:
tentative conclusions and open questions
In this section the points made so far about focus and
goals are summarised and some examples re-examined in
order to see if any conclusions can be drawn.
There are first of all, the cases in which the question
has no focus, but the speaker simply wants to know the
truth value of the (whole) proposition, as in
(25) Did John search the room?
(with no marked stress)
or, in the case of modalised questions, whether something
is epistemically, deontically or dynamically possible,
impossible or necessary:
(26) Can the police search the house?
(deontic or dynamic)
(27) Need I come?
(deontic or dynamic)
(28) Could they be on holiday?
(epistemic)
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Otherwise the speaker focuses attention on a particular
element in the question, as in
(29) Can you come on 'Wednesday?
There are linguistic markers of focus of this kind, such
as stress and pitch and cleft sentences (Quirk et al. 1972,
Chafe 1976).
However, the focus of the question in our sense (= the
most likely element to be modified in a subsequent
question) does not always coincide with the element that
has the nuclear stress. If the modal verb itself is
stressed,there may also be (another) focus within the main
predication. In any case, in the system presented here, the
modal verb itself cannot serve as the focus that is needed
in the procedure for modals. A focus has to be found
within the main predication. This is because in order to
determine the degree of the modality one has to look at
alternative states of the world; this is done by altering
the value of the focus (see chapter 4). In
(30) Do you 'have to go tomorrow?
'have to' is stressed and has the emphasis of the question
on it, but the process for answering the question would
have to look at whether 'tomorrow' is the only possibility
or not (to determine whether 'going tomorrow' is necessary
or possible). Notice also that a follow-up question to this
question would be something like 'Couldn't you stay until
Wednesday?'. It is not clear whether the case in which the
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emphatic stress falls on the modal verb itself is the only
exception, i.e. whether in all cases in which the emphatic
stress does not fall on the modal but on another element,
this other element would also be the focus of the question.
But since this is not known, perhaps one should keep the
two concepts separate, so that we may have elements that
are stressed and elements that are in focus, and these do
not have to coincide.
In cases in which there is no focus (in our sense), the
whole of the main predication has to be changed in order
to see whether an alternative state of the world is
possible or necessary. For example, with
(31) Do you have to go?
one would see whether, from the point of view of some
goal, 'going (now)' is necessary, or whether staying is
possible as well. (Predications without focus are a problem
for the system presented here, since it can only look at an
alternative state of the world by changing the focus.)
It is possible that there are other linguistic rules, in
addition to the ones mentioned above, for finding the focus.
For example, any syntactically optional element at the end
of the sentence could be taken to be a 'default' focus, if
there is no other marked focus (cf. Quirk et al. 1972: 388).
Sidner (1979) has proposed that deep case roles of NPs
may play a role and that there is a hierarchy in which the
case roles are considered (from the hearer's point of view)
2
as candidates for focus.
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In wh-questions the focus is of course the wh-word. As
to yes-no questions, one could say that trying to determine
the focus of a yes-no question is comparable to trying to
find a related wh-question. If the yes-no question can be
turned to a wh-question it is the element that is replaced
by a wh-word which is the focus of the question.
Interpretations (i) and (ii) of example (1) ('Can the painters
start on the 29th?') can be related to the wh-questions
(i') When can the painters start?
(ii') Who can start on the 29th?
respectively.
It is not claimed, however, that focussed questions are
another form of wh-questions. As was pointed out above,
there are some yes-no questions, especially ones asking
about the existence of an entity/entities that can be
construed as wh-questions. But the kind of modalised,
focussed questions that occur for example in the scheduling
domain are different from wh-questions in that a value for
whatever is in focus is given in the question, and the point
of the question is whether that value is feasible with
respect to the goal.
In this study 'focus of the question' refers to that
element or part of the question that the questioner's
interest is focused upon. Following Kaplan (1979), it may be
described as that element which is most likely to be
changed in a follow-up question. What is in focus depends
on what immediate (conversational) goal the speaker wants
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to achieve by uttering the question.
In the house construction example
(1) Can the painters start on the 29th?
we have the following context: the overall goal, shared by
the participants, is to finish the house at the earliest
possible time or by some specified time X. The overall goal
is known to the participants either because they recognise
each other's roles or because it has been established in
(some) previous discourse.
The immediate goal of the speaker in uttering the
question is either to arrange a time for job J or a job for
a time T (i.e. either the job or the time is in focus). Both
of these alternatives are subgoals of the overall goal of
finishing the house by time X. This means that if (as is
assumed here) the overall goal is known to the
interlocutors, the search for the immediate goal is limited
to the subgoals of the overall goal; and vice versa, if the
immediate goal is deducible from the utterance itself, but
the overall goal is not known to the hearer, the search for
the overall goal is limited to those goals of which the
immediate goal is a subgoal.
However, in the present example, knowing what the
overall goal is does not solve the problem of which one of
the two possible subgoals the speaker wants to solve when
he asks the question.
What is in focus depends on which subgoal is being
considered. The hearer knows that the goal and the
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subgoal have to be part of the same planning tree or
planning network, but knowing what the goal is does not
necessarily help to choose the subgoal if there are several
candidates, and vice versa.
What has here been described as determining the
speaker's immediate goal in uttering the question
corresponds closely to what Allen and Perrault (1980) call
plan inference (cf. discussion above), i.e. the hearer trying
to infer the plan of the speaker, e.g. inferring whether the
speaker wants to board a train or meet a train when
asking 'When does the train to Windsor leave?'
Our domain is different from theirs in that in their
(non-modal) context the overall goals of the interlocutors
do not matter, whereas in the modal context they do.
Allen and Perrault use semantic clues, (pragmatic)
knowledge about the plans relevant in the domain, and the
interlocutors' knowledge of each other's roles in their plan
inference mechanism. There may also be phonological and
syntactic clues, such as the ones discussed above, used by
the speaker and the hearer to mark/find the focus of the
question, which in turn may help to infer the plan of the
speaker. Which of the clues discussed above are important,
and how they work and interact, are open questions at the
moment.
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3.5. Root modals and goal orientation
Deontic modality, especially deontic necessity is
obviously related to the goals of the speaker, if he is also
the deontic source, since it is the primary function of this
modality to issue mands and directives (Lyons 1977: 840), in
other words, to get people to do things or to prevent
them from doing something. For example,
(32) You must bring that book back tomorrow.
(33) You must not pick these flowers.
seem to be related to some ulterior goal or reason; the
goal may be expressed as well:
(32') You must bring that book back tomorrow,
because I've promised to give it to Nigel.
(33') You must not pick these flowers,
because I want the garden to look nice.
Deontic possibility (permission), on the other hand, does
not have to be related to a goal; A's saying to B
(34) You may go.
may be the result of establishing that A has no goal that
conflicts with B going. But establishing this does involve
searching for goals that might conflict with B going.
Linguists who are in favour of a monosemantic view of
the modals have argued that necessity modals can be
analysed in terms of "something requires p" (where p is
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the proposed action) (Ehrman 19 66:67,7 3) or "something
entails p" (Perkins 1980: 64).
Kratzer (1977) goes further in claiming that not only
assertions containing necessity modals but all modalised
assertions should be analysed as having an implicit "in view
of" phrase attached to them. How the "in view of" phrase
is completed determines what kind of modality the
assertion contains: whether it is epistemic, deontic or
dynamic. For example, consider the interpretations (a-c) of
(35) (modified from Kratzer 1977):
(35) Bear hunters must be brave.
a. In view of what is known, bear hunters
must be brave, (epistemic)
b. In view of their duties, bear hunters
must be brave, (deontic)
c. In view of their aims, bear hunters
must be brave, (dynamic)
Dakin (1970) discusses the way that the use of modals
or related verbs (the so-called semi-modals) implies that
there is a reason for the event that took place (all his
examples are in the past tense), even if the reason is not
given explicitly. For example,
(36) John had to stop.
implies that there was something that caused him to stop.
The explanation as to what caused the event can be given,
e.g.
(37) John had to stop because his brakes jammed.
but it does not have to be expressed for the implication to
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be there. There are various mechanisms for giving the
explanation (because explanation followed by so, order of
the clauses, etc) (see Dakin 1970: 199-200).
Dakin employs a speech act analysis: 'John stopped' is
represented as "I state S" and 'John had to stop' as
I state S
I state X caused S
The 'something' or X that caused John to stop can according
to Dakin be either an antecedent cause or a state of
affairs which required him to stop. If John had to stop
because his brakes jammed, that is a physical cause; if John
had to stop because the traffic lights changed to red, he
was 'demanded' to stop. The difference between causation
and demand in the sense Dakin uses the terms is based on
time relations: a causing event precedes the event which
constitutes the effect; an existing state of affairs demands
an action (Dakin 1970: 200, 203). It seems that the demands
have to do with laws (of the society), regulations, and
other comparable systems. There is a similarity between
demands in this sense and goals in that the action
demanded by a state of affairs and an action required in
order to reach a goal are voluntary actions. Dakin's
positive past tense assertions are factive, i.e. the action is
asserted to have taken place, but if we take an assertion
referring to the future, such as
(38) You must stop when the light is red.
the action does not take place inevitably; one can choose
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not to stop (even if it may be at a cost). And in fact
even in the past tense assertions, the action did not
inevitably follow from the demand; the agent could have
chosen not to stop.
(39) John had to stop because the lights
turned red.
is an example of deontic modality. It is clear that in
deontically modalised sentences there has to be an agent
and a voluntary verb. But in other cases, if the action is
involuntary, if there is no choice, or if there is no agent,
it is odd to use MUST or HAVE TO:
(40) John slipped on a banana skin and
had to fall.
The verb FALL normally denotes an involuntary action; one
would normally say 'John slipped on a banana skin and fell'.
In Dakin's example
(41) John had to stop because his brakes jammed.
although the cause is a physical cause (Dakin 1970: 213), the
verb STOP is still a voluntary verb, and there is an agent
performing the action, and so one can still construe the
main clause as depending to some extent on John's decision.
If there is no agent, one cannot use HAVE TO in a root
sense:
(42) ?The car without a driver had to stop.
Dakin's analysis in terms of demands is one way of
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explaining objective deontic modality. Perhaps causes in his
sense could be interpreted as circumstances for analysing
dynamic modality. However, neither are obviously the same
as the interlocutors' goals; but they are linked to these
goals in a systematic way. Nor are the goals identical to
the deontic source; in example (38), in fact, the laws or
regulations that the demand depends on are the deontic
source.
Root modality always refers to the future. Even if the
assertion is in the past tense, the proposed action is in
the future as looked at from the point of reference. Goals
are always in the future as well: with root necessity, for
instance, whatever brings about the necessity is in the
future. Even with objective deontic necessity (where Dakin
claims the 'demand' is by the present state of affairs) it
can be claimed that the demand is also linked to the
future consequences of actions. In contrast to root
modality, epistemic modality can refer to past, present or
future, and the 'reason' for the necessity derives from
what the speaker knows or believes at the moment of
speaking.
It will be argued in this thesis that the interlocutors
goals have to be taken into account in interpreting
dynamically and deontically modalised utterances. It will be
claimed that necessity is always goal-oriented and that




4.1.1. The senses of can
The following senses are usually given for can: it
expresses ability, permission and possibility (Leech 1971:
667-71; Quirk et al. 1972: 97; Palmer 1979; Coates 1980:
i
153). Examples of these are:
(1) John can run faster than Mike.
(ability)
(2) I can't go swimming tomorrow.
(possibility)
(3) Mr Duncan can start painting the
windows on Monday.
(possibility or permission)
(4) You can go in now.
John can go in now.
(permission or possibility)
These senses are sometimes treated as different meanings
of can: linguists who are in favour of a univocal view of
the modals see them as variations of one basic meaning.
The basic meaning is often given as "nihil obstat", or there
is nothing that precludes the event from taking place
(Ehrman 1966: 12). Developments of this view are presented
in Wertheimer (1972) and Perkins (1980). Both explain the
differences between the senses by relating them to
different systems of laws.
In the case of can the relevant systems of laws would
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be something like laws of nature, physical laws or a
scientific theory on the one hand, and laws of the society
or a moral code on the other hand. These are relevant to
the possibility sense and the permission sense respectively.
Perkins, whose analysis is based on that of Wertheimer
(1972), then gives the following formula as the definition of
can:
K(c does not preclude that e occur)
where K stands for natural laws or laws of the society, c
is either a circumstance or a deontic source and e is the
event (Perkins 1980: 61). The formula can be paraphrased as
follows:
"within the system of natural laws, there is no
circumstance that precludes the event e from
occurring"
This is the possibility sense of can, and the permission
sense can be paraphrased as follows:
"within the laws/rules of society, nothing/
nobody precludes the event e from occurring"
A different view is given by Isard and Longuet-Higgins
(1973). In their domain of the game of tic-tac-toe, the
relevant sense of can is the possibility sense, and it is
defined as "there is a strategy that will necessarily lead
to [the proposed event]". So
(5) I can win this game.
can be paraphrased roughly as
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"I have a strategy which will necessarily win this
game (that is, whatever my opponent does)"
and the definition also includes the sense of choice, i.e. "if
I choose to use that strategy" (Isard and Longuet-Higgins
1973: 194-5).
It is unclear why the qualification 'necessary' is included
in this definition.
In their program can is construed in the sense "what is
possible from the point of view of the rules of the game".
The question 'Can you win?' could be interpreted in other
ways, for example, as "Have you got the ability to win?".
But in this example the possibility is not related to any
goals.
The sentence
(6) John: Mr Duncan can start painting the windows
on Monday.
may be interpreted in slightly different ways depending on
the context and who is uttering the sentence to whom. If
John has been trying to arrange for somebody to come and
paint the windows of his house, he might say (6) to his
wife to tell her that the painter (Mr Duncan) can fit their
house into his schedule next week starting on Monday.
However, if he says (6) to the foreman of the painters or
builders he probably means that that time of starting the
painting job suits him. (6) can also be interpreted as
expressing permission (deriving from some factual reason) or
even as a command, if uttered by a superior of Mr Duncan's.
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One might argue that from the hearer's point of view
these differences in the interpretation are perhaps not
relevant or important, and that all he needs to know is
whether in general p is possible. This is probably often
the case (cf. Coates 1980 for a discussion of indeterminacy
and merger). However, when the sentence is a question, e.g.
(7) Can Mr Duncan start painting the windows
on Monday?
the hearer has to decide, before he can answer, what he is
being asked about - possibility in relation to what, in view
of what?
If we look at the definitions given above in the review
of the senses of can, it becomes apparent that they cannot
explain all the variations in the interpretation of it.
According to Perkins, the interpretation of
(8) Mr Duncan can/cannot start painting the
windows on Monday.
is: "within the system of natural laws, there is no (there
is some) circumstance which precludes Mr Duncan starting
to paint the windows on Monday". The corresponding
question would have the interpretation "is there any
circumstance which precludes Mr Duncan from starting
painting the windows on Monday?". There are two
criticisms of this. One is that although the paraphrase
sounds intuitively close to the meaning of can, it is not
correct. The impossibility of a proposition or event does
not have to depend on one or even a limited number of
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circumstances (although it often does) (cf. below). The
second is that this definition does not say how one comes
to know that something prevents the event, or what sort
of circumstances to look for, or how to decide what sort
of circumstances to look for; in short, what the procedures
are for understanding and answering a question with can.
In Isard and Longuet-Higgins' (1973) program, when it is
asked a question like
(9) Can I win?
the system goes into a hypothetical mode where it runs
through the rest of the game, checking all variations of it
that are still possible, and if it finds a strategy that wins
the game, it replies 'yes'. If it cannot find such a
strategy, it replies 'no'.
The context of a game shows that it is not always the
case that there is one circumstance or a limited number of
circumstances that make an event impossible. At a
particular moment in a game of tic-tac-toe or chess, it
may be the case that it is impossible to win the game, not
because of one single fact, circumstance or reason, but
because all the available strategies lead to a defeat. In
other words, it would not be possible to give any other
'reason' for the impossibility than that there is no winning
strategy.
Can does however often imply conditionality, and
impossibility is often explained by speakers by giving the
reason why the event is impossible. Coates (1980: 167)
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gives some interesting statistics about sentences containing
root cannot or can't: in most cases the speakers gave the
reason of why the event was impossible. But even if the
possibility often depends on one condition, this is not
necessarily the case, and a more general definition than the
"nihil obstat" view in this form must be found for can.
When answering a question like
(10) Mr Duncan: Can I start painting the windows
on Monday?
the hearer has to go through considerations like the
following:
- is it possible physically (are the windows ready for
painting)?
- is his starting on Monday realizable from my point
of view (e.g. will there be someone in to open the
door)?
- does it have any consequences which are
incompatible with goals I have (e.g. getting the
windows done before the winter)?
The hearer perhaps also realizes that there are factors
that he need not worry about; for example, is the painters'
work schedule or diary free for that time, whether the
painter can get the paint by then, etc., which he knows are
the business of the speaker (the painter), not the hearer in
this case.
The procedure will then have to see whether there
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exists a plan which realizes the proposition ("Mr Duncan
start painting the windows on Monday") and which
incorporates the relevant features, including the goals that
the speaker, the hearer or both of them hold.
If it is assumed that people generally try to be helpful
and co-operative when answering questions (cf. Grice 1975),
and that they recognise the interlocutor's intentions (cf.
Allen and Perrault 1980), it must also be able to give
appropriate (different) answers depending on what the
outcome of the procedures mentioned above are. For
example,
(11) Mary: Can we have the windows painted this
month?
could elicit the following answers:
(12) John:
a. Yes.
b. Yes, in fact we must do it this month,
if we want to get it done before the
winter.
c. No, because they have to be repaired
first.
d. No, we can't afford it, if you want to
have a new carpet for the living-room
as well.
In (a) the event is possible but not necessary, in (b) it is
necessary if a (mutual) goal is to be met, in (c) it is not
possible, and in (d) it is not possible if a goal (of the
speaker of the question) is to be met.
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4.1.2. A procedure for dynamic can for direct questions
This section will describe the procedure that deals with
direct questions containing can in the scheduling domain,
such as
(13) Can the painters start on the 29th?
This is interpreted in the sense "Is it feasible that the
painters start on the 29th, if the completion time for the
house is day X?" For simplicity, other factors that might
influence the feasibility (and which would have to be taken
into account in a real situation) are not considered. The
time, e.g. 'the 29th', is taken to be the focus of the
question.
The goal is also simply given in the database, in the
form 'goal(G)' e.g. 'goal(finish(32)). Although it is possible to
have several goals in the database, the example below
assumes the single goal of finishing the house on a given
date.
The interesting question of how a relevant goal (or
possibly goals, in a real situation) are chosen, that is, how
the respondent finds and relates a particular goal to a
particular question, is an unsolved problem. The algorithm
for it would probably use several approaches: a goal may
have been established in the preceding context; it may be
implicit in the non-linguistic context; it may be deducible
from the interlocutors' roles; or it may be explicitly
expressed in or deducible from the utterance (the question)
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itself.
The system can give any of the following responses to
(13):
(14) a. Yes.
b. Yes, indeed they must if the goal is to
be kept.
c. No, they cannot if the goal is to be
kept.
d. No, it is impossible.
e. Yes, they will start on that day.
The first answer is given if, with respect to the goal, it
is possible that the painters start on the 2 9th, but it is
not necessary that they start then; it would be possible
for them to start on some other day, say the 30th,
without altering the completion time. Answer (14b) is
given if it is not only possible but necessary for the
painters to start on the 29th: that time is the only
starting time which is compatible with achieving the goal
(neither any earlier nor any later time is feasible; in this
example this is because the job is on the critical path).
The system embodies the narrow meaning of possibility,
in which possibility and necessity do not overlap. See
below for discussion.
The difference between (14c) and (14d) is that in (14c)
the impossibility is caused by the goal, whereas in (14d)
the impossibility is absolute. In (14b) and (14c) the
if-clause also expresses the fact that the goal is
something which may be regarded as flexible. For example,
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in (14b), if the goal is altered, the necessity may cease to
exist.
The system gives the answer (14e) if it has already been
arranged that the painters come on the day proposed in
the question (see below for discussion of this point).
When the system is asked
Can the painters start on the 29th?
the parser processes this sentence and returns a simple
semantic representation (SR) in the form
question(yesno,can(p))
In this case p = starttime(painters, 29), so the full SR of
(13) is
question(yesno,can(starttime(painters,29))).
(The first parameter, 'yesno', indicates the type of
question.)
This SR together with the focus f of the question (here
f = 29) is the input to the procedure for answering
modalised questions. The output of the modal questions
procedure is one of the following results:
(R1) can(p)
(R2) xnust(p) if g




These results correspond to the responses (14a - 14e).
The actual response is formulated on the basis of both
the result and the form of the question.
In the following description of the procedure for
modalised questions the notation 'plan(p)' refers to a
routine that calls the planner to find a plan for p. The
argument may be a conjunct: 'plan(p Sc g)', where g itself
may be a conjunct of goals. The procedure alters the focus
within p to test whether there are alternatives for p.
The proposition expressed in the question will be denoted
by p and where it is important to show the dependency of
p on the focus I will use the notation p(f). The notation
Foe will be used for the case when the focus is a variable.
I will indicate whether the focus variable is
instantiated at the original or at an altered value by the
notation Foc=f or Foc=/=f, where f = the value of the focus
in the (original) proposition. Taking as an example the
question in (13), with the time as focus and the goal being
'finish house by day 32', then 'plan(p(f) Sc g)' means
"plan(starttime(painters,29)) Sc finish-house(32))"
and 'plan(p(Foc) Sc g) Sc Foc=/=f' means
"plan(starttime(painters,Foc)) Sc finish-house(32)),
where Foc=/ =29", i.e. "find a plan for the painters to start
at some time other than day 29 which allows the house to
be completed on day 32".
Given the SR as its input, the modal questions procedure
first sees whether there is a goal in the database. We
will describe first the situation where there is a goal,
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as in the scheduling domain. The task then is to find out
whether there exists a plan that realizes the conjunction
of the proposed action and the goal g, i.e. whether the
action and the goal are feasible and compatible.
Having found the goal g the system calls the planner to
see whether there is a plan that realizes (p(f) & g). If
this call of plan(p(f) 5c g) succeeds, it then checks whether
the time given is the only time, i.e. whether p(f) is
necessary with regard to g. This is done by attempting to
find some other value for the focus than the one given in
the original proposition. The planner is called to
plan(p(Foc) & g) St Foc=/=f. If this call succeeds, the result
is "can(p)": p is possible but not necessary. The system can
give the user the answer (14a).
If plan(p(Foc) St g) St Foc=/=f fails, i.e. no alternative
value can be found for the focus variable with which the
call plan(p(Foc) St g) succeeds, the conclusion is that p is
necessary. But it must be checked whether p is necessary
only in conjunction with g, or is also necessary without g.
The procedure therefore calls plan(p(Foc)) St Foc=/=f. If this
succeeds, p is not necessary on its own; the result is
"must(p) if g", and the appropriate answer is (14b).
The check for whether p is necessary on its own,
without regard to the goal, is included in the procedure
for the sake of completeness. One cannot claim "must(p)
if g" without checking that p is only necessary in relation
to the goal. (In the scheduling domain, p can only be said
to be necessary in relation to a goal. This is in
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accordance with the claim that dynamic necessity is always
linked to a goal.)
If the call plan(p(Foc)) & Foc=/=f fails, the situation
appears to be that p is necessary irrespective of the goal:
the planner can find a plan for p, but no plan for any
alternative for p. In the example program this only
happens if the procedure finds that a starting time for the
job in question has already been agreed upon. The plan in
this case is an 'empty plan' corresponding to doing nothing.
It is a precondition for a plan for a starting time for a
job that the starting time has not been fixed yet.
Therefore if the starting time has been fixed and is seen
as a fact, it is impossible to talk in terms of a plan for it
(i.e. to have anything other than the empty plan). The user
should be informed of the fact. In this case the answer
(14e) is formulated in terms of what will happen, not in
2
terms of what must happen.
If the first call, plan(p(f) & g), fails, then p is not
possible with respect to the goal, and the procedure then
checks whether p is possible by itself by calling plan(p(f)).
If this succeeds, p is possible on its own but not possible
when conjoined to the goal. The result is "not(can(p)) if g",
and the appropriate answer is (14c). If plan(p(f)) fails, p is
(absolutely) impossible: the result is the unqualified
"not(can(p))", and the answer (14d).
In this domain it is difficult to envisage a situation in
which there is no goal. Even if the goal of finishing the
house by a certain date is dropped, the general goal of
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finishing the house still remains. However, dynamic
modality does not always have to be linked to goals, if the
modality in question is possibility rather than necessity.
The problems with cases in which there are no relevant
goals will be dealt with below; they have not been
incorporated in the example program.
The procedure outlined above can be represented in a
simple network, which is given in Figure 3. It must be
stressed that the ordering of the operations in the
network is not the only possible one. The important thing
are the results and what operations are necessary to
arrive at each result; not in what order the operations are
done.
Two points about the procedure that have already been
mentioned require further comment.
The first is the case where it is found that an
agreement about the starting time for a job has been made.
The program discovers this in the process of trying to
determine the degree of modality. If p is taken as
arranged, then the question of the feasibility or necessity
of p ceases to be relevant. The information that an
agreement has been made should be given to the user both
in the case in which the answer is 'Yes, they will come on
that day' and when the answer is 'No, they will come on
day t'. In the latter case an agreement having been made
for another date is one of the many possible reasons for
the proposed action being impossible.
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Figure 3 : Decision tree for answering direct questions
containing dynamic can or must
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People do tend to give reasons as to why an action is
impossible (Coates 1980: 167). It would be desirable to
have the program give a reason for the impossibility,
whatever it is caused by, unless it is caused by a
combination of several factors rather than a single factor.
A question containing can is commonly a preliminary for
arranging something. In the scheduling domain an exchange
like
A: Can the painters start on the 29th?
B: Yes, they can.
could be followed by something like
A: O.K., lets put them down for the 29th then.
B: O.K.
However, if B knows that the arrangement has already been
made, he is likely to point this out to A as an immediate
response to A's question. The procedure for modal
questions finds out and gives this fact because it cannot
satisfy the precondition that the starting time must be
'unfixed'. Can is typically only used if a choice is involved.
Another way of doing it would be for the system to check,
before exploring the possibility or necessity, whether p has
been arranged, and only to go on to the modality routine if
no arrangement has been made. The latter method is' based
on the speaker's attempt to anticipate the interlocutor's
next move in the conversation.
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The second, more important point about the procedure
outlined above is the way it defines "can" by excluding both
necessity and impossibility.
Logicians distinguish between a wide and a narrow
meaning of possibility. The wide meaning does not exclude
the meaning of necessity: if p is necessary it is also
possible. The narrow meaning of possibility excludes the
meaning of necessity: what is possible is not necessary
(Reichenbach 1947: 128; cf. also Jespersen 1924: 324-5;
Hintikka 1960, Burton-Roberts 1984). The two meanings of
possibility are often represented as follows:
I I possibility |
| impossibility | | necessity | (wide
| I | | meaning)
| impossibility | possibility | necessity | (narrow
I I I | meaning)
According to Reichenbach (1947: 128) the narrow
interpretation of possibility is used in conversational
language. People do not say that an event is possible if
they know that it is necessary. This is also the view
embodied in the system presented here: can is interpreted
as representing narrow possibility. Therefore, if the
proposed action is necessary, answer (14b) is given to
question (13), not answer (14a).
An explanation in terms of the co-operative principle is
also possible here: it could be argued that it is likely to
be relevant for the hearer to know that something is
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necessary, if he is interested in whether it is possible.
If the narrow meaning is accepted as the meaning of
dynamic possibility, it could be defined as "not(impossible(p))
& not(necessary(p))".
Our system defines dynamic possibility by verifying that
p is possible but not necessary: p is possible if there is a
plan which realizes p; p is not necessary if also not(p) is
possible and compatible with achieving the goal. However,
the system does not ask the planner to find a plan for
'not(p)' or 'not(p) 8c g'. The planner cannot handle a call to
find a plan for a negated action. Instead, the procedure
changes the focus element, f, in p(f), giving the proposition
p(Foc) and then calls the planner (perhaps several times) to
find a value of Foe such that Foc=/=f.
4.1.3. Discussion and extensions within dynamic modality
Can is sometimes associated with a goal, sometimes not.
The goal to which the feasibility of the action or event is
related may be expressed or it may be implicit. The
following are examples of goal-oriented can:
(15) What time can you get away? (Palmer 1979:83)
(16) I can't take any time off this week.
(17) We can't stop now if we want to get back by
8 o'clock.
(18) Can we stop now if we want to get back by 8?
(19) Olive oil can be used to protect the surface
of a wooden salad bowl.
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Notice that an if-clause that expresses the goal (as in
17 and 18) can only be attached to negative or
interrogative (i.e. non-assertive) utterances; it is not
normally attached to positive assertions:
(20) ?We can stop now if we want to get back by 8.
although
(21) We can stop now even if we want to get back
by 8.
seems acceptable. (Other kinds of if-clauses can of course
be attached to positive assertions with can, e.g. 'We can
stop here if you want a cup of coffee'.)
Examples of can without a goal include cases in which it
expresses ability (ability as, or dependent on, a property
that an entity has):
(22) Can you speak English?
(23) John can't lift that weight.
(Palmer 1979: 87)
as well as cases of the so-called existential modality:
(24) Welshmen can be tall.
and cases of non-modal uses of can, as in
(25) I can see the moon.
But the can of feasibility does not have to be linked to
a goal either; there are a lot of examples of a purely
circumstantial can of feasibility, without any association to
8?
a goal; for example,
(26) You can travel from Belgium to France with
less palaver than you can travel from the
North to the South of Ireland.
(Palmer 1979: 71)
(27) Most house plants can be propagated by this
method.
(28) Can I win (this game)?
With dynamic modality, the goal that the modality is
related to may be anybody's goal: it may be the speaker's
or the hearer's goal, it may be shared, or it may be a
third party's goal.
In the exchange
(29) User: Can the plumbers come on the 15th?
System: Yes, they can.
the goal of finishing the house by time x can be thought of
as either the user's goal or as a shared goal.
The same question could be used to refer to the
plumbers' intentions, that is, whether the plumbers can
come on the 15th with regard to their other commitments,
e.g. jobs that they have already undertaken to do at that
time; roughly, this would be equivalent to asking "Do you
know if the plumbers can come on the 15th?". Here the
question relates to neither the speaker's nor the hearer's
goal.
An example in which the feasibility depends on the
respondent's intentions would be
(30) A: Can you drive me to the airport tomorrow
morning?
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B(1): Yes, I can.
B(2): No, I can't because I have a meeting
in the morning.
There has to be a mechanism which finds whose goals
are relevant in a given situation. This presumably has to
do, among other things, with how the question is
interpreted: whether as a request, asking for permission,
etc. (cf. discussion of these below).
With (30) the respondent has to look at his own goals
and see whether the proposed action and his goals are
compatible. One of the preconditions of the action
proposed in (30) is (assuming that the starting point for
the journey to the airport is 'home')
at(home, B, morning M)
but B's goal, attending the meeting, has the precondition
that he be at the meeting place in the morning; so the
plans clash, and the result is "not(can(p)) if g".
We now have to look at can in contexts in which we
have no goals.
In example (30), if B has no intentions for the following
morning, it would seem that only the preconditions for the
proposed action need to be checked. The results are either
"can(p)" (if there is a plan) or "not(can(p))" (if some
condition(s) are not satisfied).
If there are no goals, there can be no dynamic necessity,
and the scale of modality does not include necessity modals.
But there is still the possibility that the event not only
can but will happen. As was discussed above, one context
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where we assume that the event will occur is the case of
an arrangement having been made. The two possible ways
to deal with this are: (1) when encountered with a
modalised question the system first checks whether the
event has been arranged (or is already actual), and (2) the
system finds this out in the process of trying to build a
plan for the action, as this fact constitutes an unsatisfied
precondition of the action. Method (2) has been adopted
here.
There are other cases in which it may be pointed out in
the answer that the event will happen, for example:
(31) A: Can caustic soda burn your hands?
B: It will burn your hands if you put your
hands in it.
Consider also
(32) You can turn the central heating on by
pressing the red button.
which is equivalent to
(33) If you press the red button the central
heating will come on.
In the type of sentence exemplified by (32), the by-clause
gives the essential condition for the event of the main
clause to occur; the meaning of (32) can be expressed as an
if-then condition.
Taking into account the fact that dynamic possibility
may be goal-oriented or not, we can present a modified




Figure 4 : Extended decision tree for dynamic modality
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possibility. This is given in Figure 4. It will be noticed
that the operations do not proceed in the same order as in
the network given in Figure 3. As was pointed out there,
the order of the steps is not crucial.
4.1.4. The can of ability
The difference between the can of feasibility and the
can of ability is that the former depends on circumstances,
on conditions being satisfied, whereas the ability to do
something is a fact about an entity, a property of an
entity.
To answer questions like
(34) Can you drive?




needs to be checked. Can in this sense is equivalent to
"know how", ('knowhow' is here used in the sense "have the
3
knowledge and skill to perform the action".)
But can can also ask or be interpreted to be about
"fitness". Thus (34) could be about either (or both)
(i) knowhow(drive, Agent)
(ii) fit(drive, Agent).
It could be interpreted as (ii) in a context in which the
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questioner had some reason to think that the respondent
perhaps was unable to drive (e.g. if he had hurt his arm).
Considering a question about possibility in general (not
only ability), in a question like
4
(36) Can you drive me to the airport on Saturday?
'drive' can be thought of as an operator (in the sense that
operators are used in a planner like STRIPS; see Fikes &
Nilsson 1971). The operator 'drive' has the following
parameters:
drive(X, (Y), From, To, Time)
(X drives (Y) from somewhere to somewhere
at a time)
The first argument, the agent, is compulsory. The second
argument, Y (the passenger or ooject) is optional. But if
any argument other than X is present, then the last three
arguments have to be filled in: if they are not given in the
question, they have to be supplied from the context. In
(36) the From parameter has to be supplied and could be
for instance "here" or "home".
The operator 'drive(X, (Y), From, To, Time)' would have







In other words, the driver, the passenger and the car have
to be at place From at Time and the driver has to be able
to drive. The precondition of ability has to be satisfied
even when the question is about possibility in general.
The question 'Can you drive?' may of course also refer
to a specific time and place and have for example the
meaning "Can you drive from here onwards?" if the missing
parameters can be filled in from the context. But in a
context in which the only parameters are the agent and




These are preconditions of the operator 'drive'.
Some activity verbs like DRIVE, SWIM, PLAY (an
instrument, a game), when considered as operators in a
plan, always have 'knowhow(Activity, Agent)' as one of their
preconditions. It would seem that many dynamic verbs also
have, at least implicitly, a condition that stipulates that
the agent be fit enough, i.e. physically capable of
performing the action. The latter condition is more general
than the former: the 'knowhow' condition does not always
apply although the 'fitness' condition does apply. For
example, verbs like COME, GO, LEAVE do not have it:
(37) Can you come?
can only refer to possibility that depends on circumstances
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or goals, or on physical ability ("Are you well enough to
come?"), but it cannot be interpreted as "Do you know how
to come?".
Some verbs may have the 'knowhow' condition in some
contexts; in other contexts it may be taken for granted
that this condition is satisfied. For example, with WALK,
as in
(38) Can he walk?
the 'knowhow' condition is not relevant and the above
question would be interpreted as referring to physical
ability unless 'he' refers to a child of the age at which
children learn to walk.
All the essential preconditions, including the 'knowhow'
and 'fitness' conditions, have to be checked even if the
point of view of the question is the goal(s) of the
interlocutor(s). The question
(39) A: Can you drive me to the station in the
morning?
may be asking whether B is free to do the requested
action, but B may give a negative answer on account of an
unsatisfied precondition, e.g.
B: No, I can't drive.
B: No, because my car has just broken down.
Expressions that refer to ability (in the sense of
"knowing how" or "having the skill" to do something) differ
from all other modal expressions in that there is only the
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dichotomy "able" /"not able"; there is no third value, no
corresponding necessity (cf. Palmer 1979: 23). This is
explained by the fact that ability is a property of the
agent; the agent either has the property or does not have
it. This fact is not affected by goals that might be
present in a given situation.
There are two ways of dealing with ability can in our
procedural framework. The first is to let the modal
procedure handle it in essentially the same way it handles
other dynamic questions containing can, using the planner
to find a plan.
Let us compare how the procedure would deal with the
questions
(40) Can you drive me to the airport on Saturday
morning?
and (41) Can you drive?
With question (40), the first step is for the respondent to
see if he has a relevant goal (i.e. plans for Saturday
morning); the next step is to try to solve the proposition
and the goal as a conjunct. The physical preconditions as
well as the ability of the agent (the respondent) to drive
are checked in the process of looking for plan for the
proposition (drive(b,a,...)) because they are preconditions of
the operator 'drive'. (For completeness, the permission
constraint would also have to be checked; cf. below.) If no
goals are found, only the conditions for p need to be
checked.
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If 'drive' has only one argument, as in (41), and no other
arguments are found in the context either, the only
applicable preconditions are 'knowhow(drive,b)' and
'fit(drive,b)': the two components of "inherent ability".
These are arrived at as it were by default; other
conditions, those relating to time and place etc., can be
assumed to be irrelevant, since these parameters are not
given. This leaves the ability sense of can, without the
(circumstantial) feasibility sense.
There is still the problem that the 'point' of (41) may
be either the 'knowhow' condition or the fitness condition
or both, i.e. it can mean "Do you know how to drive?" or
"Are you capable of driving?". This is, however, a general
problem: the 'point of view' of a can question may be goals,
but it may also be any of the preconditions for the
proposed action.
It may seem unsatisfactory that even if we have the
pure inherent ability sense, this system would try to find
whether there is a plan for the action, as the plan then
consists of nothing more than the fact about x that "x
knows how to drive". The defense of this way of handling
can is that in many cases in which the hearer understands
the speaker's intention, he will go through the whole plan
needed to realize that intention, including goals and
permission, anyway. If A asks B 'Can you drive?' in a
context where B realises that A's intention is to get him
to do some driving, B might answer
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(42) Yes, but I haven't got a British driving
licence.
("I know how to but the law does not permit
me to")
Another argument for including ability can within the same
procedure as other dynamic uses is the fact that can is
very often indeterminate between the different senses
(Coates 1980). (Even though the context usually guides the
interpretation, it does not always solve the indeterminacy.)
Having all the senses in the same network explains the
indeterminacy better than regarding can as polysemantic.
The alternative for treating the can of inherent ability is
to have a separate entry for this sense of can in the
dictionary. In other words, can would have the distinct
meanings of ability on the one hand and a more general
possibility or feasibility sense on the other hand; the
latter may however also include the ability sense,
depending on what kind of action can is attached to.
4.1.5. Requests
Direct can-questions are frequently used with the
illocutionary force of a request:
(43) Can you pass the salt?
(44) Can you drive me to the station tomorrow
morning?
They have been favourite examples of indirect speech acts
(see Gordon and Lakoff 1971, Searle 1975, Lyons 1977: 785,
Morgan 1978).
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There is agreement in studies on speech acts that
utterances like (43) and (44) have two illocutionary forces:
the force of a question and the force of a request, both
being intended simultaneously by the speaker (Searle 1975:
59-60, Lyons 1977: 785). According to Leech (1983: 97) a
can-question may function both as a question and as a
conditional request: the speaker wants the hearer to do
the action if the preparatory condition of the hearer being
able to do the action is satisfied.
While accepting that utterances like (43) and (44), when
intended as requests, do have these two forces, it is still
the case that the hearer, when responding to these, has to
decide whether to interpret the utterance as a question (=
a request for information) or as a request (for action) as
well as a question.
The hearer's reaction is different depending on which
interpretation he makes (and the speaker obviously expects
a different reaction).
The previous sections have dealt with how to respond
to an information-seeking question.
Responding to a request consists of either performing
the action or agreeing to perform the action in the future
(depending on how near or distant a future the request
refers to):
(43') A: Can you pass the salt?
B: Here you are.




Notice that B's answer in (44') constitutes an agreement to
perform the requested action (in addition to providing the
information that the action is possible); after this
conversation A can expect B to be there in the morning
with his car.
If the hearer reacts differently depending on whether
the utterance is a request or a question, the hearer has to
determine what illocutionary force the utterance has
before responding. (It should perhaps be pointed out that
this does not imply that utterances like (4 3) are ambiguous
semantically. There is no ambiguity in the propositional
content (except as far as can is held to be ambiguous), but
the utterance may have different pragmatic forces.)
The main problem then that requests in the form of
questions present in a procedural framework is the problem
of how the hearer determines whether the utterance has
the illocutionary force of a request or that of a question.
There may be some formal clues.
Searle (1975: 69) mentions that the intonation of a
request often differs from the intonation of the same
sentence when it is uttered with its literal illocutionary
force.
Palmer (1979) lists some formal differences between
information-seeking questions and questions used as
requests. The most obvious one is that requests may have
please added to them. Any and compounds of any- do not
occur in requests: some is used. In requests, the subject is
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2nd or 3rd person, but not 1st person (Palmer 197 9:
168-169).
This section has so far juxtaposed questions asking
about the feasibility of an action against requests asking
the hearer to perform an action. The issue becomes more
complicated when it is considered that can-questions are
also used to ask for permission, and permission-seeking
questions can sometimes also be used indirectly as
requests:
(45) Can I have the salt (please)?
(46) May I have the salt (please)?
In utterances like these the subject is T but it has the
role of patient, not agent.
Permission-seeking utterances may contain please even
when they are not intended as requests:
(47) May I please leave the room?
Can may also be used in an epistemic sense in questions:
(48) Can he be so foolish?
If can is epistemic, the utterance cannot be a request.
Features that force an epistemic interpretation include a
stative or progressive main verb. If these features are
present, the utterance cannot be an instance of root
modality, and cannot be a request.
In addition to clues like these which may be viewed as
formal although their explanation lies in semantics or
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pragmatics, there are other, different types of clues, which
depend on the principles of conversation.
An important factor in determining the illocutionary
force of an utterance are the speaker's goals.
In
(49) Can you reach the salt?
the speaker's goal is either to get the hearer to give him
information about the hearer's ability to reach the salt or
to get the hearer to pass the salt to the speaker. The
hearer has to determine which goal the speaker is most
likely to have in the context of the utterance. If the
question is uttered at a meal time at the table, and the
topic of the conversation has been something other than
the hearer's abilities, it is more likely that the speaker's
goal is to get the salt. If the hearer has hurt himself and
the conversation is about to what extent he can move his
limbs, the goal may be to get the information.
Yet another consideration in determining the
illocutionary force is the interlocutors' beliefs of what the
other participant knows. If Mary says to John
(50) Mary: Can you play an eightsome reel?
and John knows that Mary knows that John can play one,
John will interpret the utterance as a request.
The considerations about the speaker's goal(s) and about
the interlocutors' beliefs about what the other participant
knows, can be explained in terms of the maxims that form
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Grice's co-operative principle (Grice 1975).
Taking the interlocutor's goal(s) into account when
responding is how the speaker makes his contribution
relevant to the hearer.
The second point has to do with the maxim of quantity
("Make your contribution as informative as is required, but
not more informative than is required"). If the speaker of
(50) knows that p and the hearer knows that the speaker
knows that p, the question by the speaker, asking whether
p, cannot be interpreted literally (as an information-seeking
question), but must have another illocutionary force.
A procedural model would have to have some heuristics,
using factors such as the ones mentioned above, to
determine the illocutionary force of a question, to decide
whether it is a request for information, for action, or for
permission.
4.2. A note on BE ABLE TO
Although the meaning of BE ABLE TO is often given as
"having enough strength, power, means (to do a thing)", that
it is in fact equivalent to CAN in the ability sense
(Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary; Quirk et al 1972:
97, 264), it has recently been pointed out that BE ABLE TO
does in fact have a wider usage than that.
Coates (1980: 206) gives examples of BE ABLE TO in all
the senses that CAN may have: ability, permission, and
(circumstantial) possibility.
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What then are the differences between CAN and BE ABLE
TO? The following is a summary of the differences given by
Palmer (1979) and Coates (1980).
In addition to the differences in syntax and form (see
e.g. Palmer 1979) they are:
Firstly, BE ABLE TO occurs infrequently compared to CAN
(Coates 1980: 213).
Secondly, when used in an assertion in the past tense,
BE ABLE TO is factive, unlike could (Palmer 1979: 80). It
may be factive also when used in the present tense; Coates
(1980: 21 1) gives the following example:
As Hardy develops as a writer it is interesting
to observe the growing maturation of this device
of pictorial illusion, which in his hands becomes
a unique skill. In the later novels he is able to
employ it in ways that go far beyond a purely
descriptive intention.
can would be inappropriate in this example.
Thirdly, BE ABLE TO is not used in senses that depend on
implication, as in requests, suggestions, etc. (Palmer 19 79:
76). Compare
(51) Can you open the window?
(52) Are you able to open the window?
(53) We can send you a map.
(54) We are able to send you a map.
Fourthly, because BE ABLE TO can combine with WILL and
SHALL, it may be used if the speaker wants to make it
clear that the reference is to the future.
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Palmer (1979) does not come to a clear conclusion about
whether BE ABLE TO is sybject-oriented. It would seem
that it does not have to be subject-oriented in the sense
of 'inherent ability': not being able to do something may be
caused by circumstances; for example
(55) If we move the van back, he'll be able to
drive the car straight into the garage.
However, it does seem to be more restricted than can in
that, for example in
(56) A: Will the painters be able to start on
the 29th?
B: Yes.
although their 'ability to start' may be related to
circumstances and goals affecting the painters, it seems
impossible to interpret this question as relating to the
goals of either A or B (such an interpretation is possible
with can).
4.3. Must
4.3.1. The senses of must
Most descriptions of must recognise the two senses of
"obligation" and "confident inference on the basis of facts
known to the speaker", in other words a deontic and an
epistemic sense (Chafe 1970: 179; Halliday (1970), Coates
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1980: 75). Quirk et al. (1972: 101-2) give the senses
"obligation" and "logical necessity", but their terms 'logical
possibility and necessity' cannot refer to strictly logical
modality: all their relevant examples of must are examples
of confident inference rather than logical deduction.
The epistemic sense of "confident inference" must be
distinguished from logical necessity. In scientific texts
must is frequently used to express logical necessity, e.g.
(57) If a prime p is a factor of the product ab,
then p must be a factor of either a or b.
(Courant & Robbins, What is Mathematics,
1963: 24)
but in non-scientific, everyday contexts this sense is not
as common as the sense of subjective inference from facts
known to or believed by the speaker (Lyons 1977: 805;
Coates 1980: 89). Karttunen (1972) discusses how logical
modalities differ from epistemic modality: the main
observation with respect to necessity is that in natural
language an assertion containing must is a weaker assertion
than a factual assertion without must (compare 'John must
have left' with 'John has left'), whereas in modal logic,
'necessarily p' is stronger than 'p' (Karttunen 1972: 1 1-12).
In monosemantic accounts of the modals, must is defined
in terms of some circumstance or aspect of the world
which requires the action or situation of the main
predication (Ehrman 1966: 67; Perkins 1980: 134). Ehrman's
examples can be grouped into deontic, dynamic and
epistemic, since the 'aspects of the state of the world'
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that she lists (Ehrman 1966: 67,68) include rules and
regulations (example 58), ways to achieve an end (59) and
the speaker's view of the probable consequences of the
relevant factors (60). Also the logical use is subsumed
under this definition: the predication is a logical conclusion
'required' by the premises.
(58) The officer had told him that both lists
must be checked.
(59) ... a number of critical meteorological
parameters must be met for an aerosol to
exhibit optimum effect.
(60) The cars must have had their gas pedals
pushed down to the floor boards.
(Ehrman's examples nos. 261, 265, 274)
Palmer (1979) also discusses the dynamic use of must.
In the following, the dynamic sense of must will be
discussed first.
4.3.2. Procedure for dynamic must
While a question containing can often, as in our context,
serves as a preliminary to arranging something, a question
containing dynamic must or HAVE TO, such as
(61) Must the painters start on the 29th?
(62) Do the painters have to start on the 29th?
would not normally occur without some preceding discussion
of the feasibility or necessity of the proposed action (cf.
Palmer 1979: 96).
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The differences in meaning between MUST, HAVE TO and
HAVE GOT TO will be discussed in section 4.4. Here we will
not be concerned with the question of which one of these,
the modal must or either one of the quasi-modals, would be
used or would be more common in questions like (61) and
(62). The procedure deals with must: apart from syntactic
considerations, the procedure for HAVE TO and HAVE GOT TO
in this context would have to cover much of the same
ground as that for must (cf. Leech 1971: 67: HAVE TO
"cannot be semantically separated from MAY, MUST, and
CAN").
The answers that the scheduling system can give to the
question
(61) Must the painters start on the 29th?
are:
(63) a. No, they do not have to.
b. Yes, they must if the goal is to be met.
c. No, they cannot start on that day if the
goal is to be met.
d. No, it is impossible.
e. Yes, they will start on that day.
In order to answer the question the system must check
that it is feasible to start the job on the 29th and that
it is not feasible to start at any other time, given the
goal of finishing the house by time x. These two steps are
achieved by calling the planner first with plan(p(f) 5c g) and
1 03
then with plan(p(Foc) 5c g) Sc Foc=/=f. If both succeed, the
result is that p is feasible but not necessary, and the
appropriate answer is (63a).
If plan(p(f) 5c g) succeeds but plan(p(Foc) 5c g) 5c Foc=/=f
fails, p is necessary with respect to the goal, but the
procedure has to check whether p is necessary on its own
as well. It calls plan(p(Foc)) Sc Foc=/=f; if this succeeds,
the result is "must(p) if g", and the answer is (63b). If it
fails, the result is "will(p)", and the answer is (6 3e).
If the first call, plan(p(f) 5c g), fails, the procedure has
to see whether p is feasible, and it calls plan(p(f)). If this
succeeds, the result is "not(feasible(p)) if g", and the
answer is (63c). If it fails, the result is "not(feasible(p))",
and the answer is (63d).
This is exactly the same procedure as that employed for
direct questions with can. The results it gives are
repeated here for convenience:
(R1) can(p)
(R2) must(p) if g
(R3) not(can(p)) if g
(R4) not(can(p))
(R5) will(p)
Feasibility as the meaning of can was defined as
"possible but not necessary". In the procedure 'not have to'
is defined identically to can: 'not have to' means "possible
(i.e. not impossible) and not necessary".
In the same way that possibility was defined in the
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narrow sense as the meaning of can, not-necessary is
defined as excluding impossibility for the meaning of 'not
have to'. Thus dynamic 'possible' and dynamic 'not
necessary' are interpreted as covering the same area on
the scale of modality:
I | not necessary | I
| impossible | possible | necessary |
The system uses one and the same procedure for
producing the results that have been discussed for both can
and must questions. Thus, for
(64) Can the painters come on the 29th?
and (65) Must the painters come on the 29th?
the process for finding the degree of modality for the
proposition is exactly the same. The actual natural
language answers to the question may of course differ
depending on what form (what modal) the question has. The
difference is clearest when the result is (R1): can(p), in
which case the answer to (64) is
Yes, they can.
and possible answers to (65) are
No, they don't have to.
No, they needn't come then.
No, they don't need to.
Since the actual natural language answer depends not
only on the result of the modal procedure but also on the
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form of the question, the answer is formulated after the
degree of modality has been established, on the basis of
both the degree of modality and the form of the question.
The responses that the system gives to can and must
questions are repeated here:
Can the painters start on the 29th?
a. Yes, they can.
b. Yes, in fact they must if the goal is to be met.
c. No, they cannot if the goal is to be met.
d. No, it is impossible.
e. Yes, they will come on that day.
Must the painters start on the 29th?
a. No, they don't have to.
b. Yes, they must if the goal is to be met.
c. No, they cannot start on that day if the goal
is to be met.
d. No, it is impossible.
e. Yes, they will start on that day.
As was explained in connection with can, the logical
equivalent of 'necessary(p)', 'not possible that not p', is not
testable within our framework, since the planner cannot
deal with plan(not(p)). Instead, the procedure tests
whether there is a state in which p is not true by
altering the focus within p and then calling the planner.
(Cf. discussion in section 4.1.2)
What support is there for the claim that must is
always goal- oriented, not only in the deontic but also in
the dynamic sense?
Those linguists who analyse root must univocally in
terms of "x requires p", claim that there is a causal link
between the action p and some condition x that requires it
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(in the deontic sense, x is the deontic source) (Perkins
1980: 65; Ehrman 1966: 67; cf also Halliday: 1970, and
Antinucci 5c Parisi 1971: 28-29 for causation in connection
with must).
The use of the words like 'requires' or 'demands'
indicates that the link between the cause and the action is
something which is perceived as to some extent flexible:
the 'cause' does not inevitably lead to p but only demands
p. Perkins' (1980) definition "K(C entails X)" implies that he
does not share this view.
The claim here is that if there is no choice about
whether the action or process will take place, a speaker
would not necessarily use must, or any other necessity
modal. He could use some factual expression with the sense
that p is the case or will be the case.
The if-clauses in the following examples are different in
that in (66) the if-clause expresses a factual condition, and
in (67) the if-clause expresses a condition dependent on the
subject's intention:
(66) If you press the red button, the central
heating will come on.
(67) You must come by seven if you want to see
the film.
Both of these are of course normal 'if p then q'
sequences, (67) being something like 'if want(agent,p) then
nec(q)'. An interesting fact about these examples is that in
(66) the if-clause expresses a condition for achieving the
event of the main clause, whereas in (67) the proposition
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under 'must' in the main clause expresses a condition for
the event expressed under 'want' in the if-clause.
4.4. A note on HAVE TO and HAVE GOT TO
There is a lot of discussion in the literature as to the
distribution of MUST compared to that of HAVE TO or HAVE
GOT TO with respect to whether they differ in meaning, and
if so, how.
Palmer (1979: 93) sees no difference in meaning between
HAVE and HAVE GOT TO and consequently treats these as one
verb with two variants. According to him, MUST is either
deontic in a subject-oriented sense, or it is 'neutral', which
seems to be intended to refer to dynamic modality. HAVE
(GOT) TO on the other hand is either neutral or external
(the necessity comes from an external source, not the
subject).
The study by Brown and Miller (1975) on the use of the
modal verbs by Scots indicates that the differences
between how MUST and HAVE TO are interpreted are less
clear-cut than is suggested by the usual categorisation of
HAVE TO as expressing objective and MUST as subjective
deontic modality.
Coates (1980), after pointing out that there are
differences in meaning and distribution between HAVE TO
and HAVE GOT TO (see Coates 1980: 108), claims that HAVE TO
is always used to convey objective deontic modality
whereas both MUST and HAVE GOT TO can be either
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subjective or objective (Coates 1980: 1 13). She does not
discuss the differences between these verbs when they are
used in a dynamic sense.
All of these verbs occur in questions (Palmer 1979: 96):
(68) Must you go?
(69) Have you got to go?
(70) Do you have to go?
4.5. Wh-questions
This study has so far dealt with modalised yes-no
questions and how to answer them. The next task is to
see how the framework could handle wh-questions.
Direct questions ask about the truth or falsity of a
proposition; modalised direct questions about the
feasibility, possibility or necessity of the proposition.
Wh-questions ask for a value for a variable. If we have a
dynamically modalised wh-question it asks for a value with
which the proposition is feasible or necessary.
For the questions
(71) When can the painters start?
(72) When must the painters start?
the parser returns a simple semantic representation in the
form
question(when, can(starttime(painters , T)))
question(when, must(starttime(painters, T)))
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(the first parameter, here 'when', indicates the type of
question, i.e. yes-no or wh-question).
To answer (71) the procedure must find a value for T
such that when T is instantiated to that value, the
proposition is feasible (the system finds a plan for the
proposed action p).
What kind of answer might (71) get, assuming again that
the question is related to the goal of finishing the house
at time X?
If it is found that the job of painting is not on the
critical path, (7 3a) and (7 3b) are possible answers:
(73) a. They can start any time between t1 and t2.
b. They can start for instance on t1.
Answer (7 3a) is probably the most helpful in this particular
context; in other contexts (73b) might occur. This would be
in contexts where it is impossible or very cumbersome to
give a list of all the possible values for T.
It would seem that in computing an answer for a
modalised wh-question one has to take into account
whether the set of possible values is finite and small,
finite but large, or infinite. In the latter two cases it
either may not be worth computing all possible values or it
is impossible; instead, the first value that is found could
be offered in the answer. (Or it may be easier to list the
values with which p is not possible, stating that all other
values make p possible; e.g. 'They can start any time except
Wednesday'.)
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If the job is on the critical path, we will assume again
that it is more natural to answer
(73c) They must start on the 29th (if the house
is to be finished by day 32).
rather than
They can start on the 29th.
The result that is the basis of answer (7 3c) is achieved
using the same procedure as for the equivalent answer
(must(p) if g) for direct questions: it is ascertained that
there is only one value for T which is compatible with the
goal.
With wh-questions, as with direct questions, the answer
(73d) They will come on day t1 .
is given if the starting time has been fixed by agreement.
Giving a negative answer to a wh-question is more
complex than giving a negative answer to a yes-no
question. Direct questions ask whether something is true
or false and expect either 'Yes' or 'No' as the answer. A
wh-question, e.g.
(74) When can we start building the swimming pool?
presupposes that the swimming pool can be started at some
time (cf. Lyons 1977: 758). A negative result means that
the presupposition is wrong, and this has to be expressed
in the answer. If a swimming pool is not mentioned in the
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contract, the answer may be something like
(75) There is not going to be a swimming pool in
this house.
As with direct questions, with wh-questions there is
the distinction between impossibility because of physical
(inflexible) circumstances and impossibility because of
incompatibility with a goal: p may be impossible with any
value, or impossible with any value if the goal is to be
achieved.
This means that the responses as regards the degree of
modality are the same as to direct questions, and the
procedure proceeds in a similar way.
The obvious differences are the following. There is no
problem in finding the focus: it is the wh-element. The
task is to find a value or values for the unknown element,
which is an uninstantiated variable at the beginning of the
procedure, and the degree of modality, and give both the
value for the focus and the degree of modality in the
response.
Figure 5 given below represents the steps needed to
answer wh-questions which contain can and must. If it is
compared to the tree for direct questions with can and
must in Figure 3, it will be seen to be similar except for
two things. The first is that the focus variable Foe is not
instantiated at the beginning: at node 3 the procedure
tries to find a value f for focus such that plan(p(f) & g)







Figure 5 : Decision tree for answering wh-questions
containing dynamic can or must
1/3
there is another value f1 such that f1 = /=f, at which
plan(p(f 1 )&g) also succeeds, and so on (cf. discussion of
direct questions and Figure 3 in section 4.1.2.).
Secondly, in the results, the value of focus has to be
inserted into p. The answers can then be formulated. The
possible results and (some) equivalent answers are listed
below. As was pointed out above, negative answers may
take various forms because they contain a denial of a
presupposition.
(R1) can(p) with e.g. Foc=f
(R2) must(p) with Foc=f if g
(R3) not(can(p)) with any value of Foe if g
(R4) not(can(p)) with any value of Foe
(R5) will(p) with Foc=f
(A1) They can start for instance on day 20.
(A2) They must start on day 20 if the goal is to
be kept.
(A3) It is impossible to do that job if the goal
is to be kept.
(A4) It is impossible to do that job.
(A5) They will start on day 20.
Negative wh-questions present a problem. Negative
direct questions can be processed by dropping the negation,
finding out whether p is true or false, and responding 'Yes'
or 'No' respectively. For example,
(76) a. Has this bill been paid?
b. Has this bill not been paid?
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(76a) and (76b) will both get the answer 'yes' if the bill
has been paid, and 'no' if the bill has not been paid. The
answer to (7 6a) depends on the same set as the answer to
(76b). But the answers to
(77) a. Which bills have been paid?
b. Which bills have not been paid?
will belong to complementary sets.
This is true also of modalised wh-questions. For
(78) When can the painters come?
one has to find the set of times such that there is a
strategy for 'starttime(painters, Time)', and for
(79) When can the painters not come?
a set of times such that there is a strategy for
'not(starttime(painters, Time))'. This is impossible in the
present framework, as the planner cannot be asked for a
plan for a negated event. However, the answer to (7 9)
could be achieved by listing those instantiations of Time at




The purpose of this section is to look at how the
procedure for dynamic modality, described in the previous
section, could be extended to cover deontic modality as
well. The claim is made here that with some modification
the system can handle all root modality, both dynamic and
deontic. It must be pointed out, however, that the
procedure has not been tested in the form that would
handle deontic modality.
In this section we are concerned with direct questions
containing modals and answers to these questions.
Deontic modality differs from dynamic modality in that
there is a 'deontic source', an authority from which the
permission, obligation, or prohibition derives. In
interpreting questions like
(1) Can I borrow your car?
(2) Can I take this book out (of the library)?
one has to detect from the context and the content of the
question whether it is a situation in which there is a
relevant authority, whether the possibility depends on some
authority which is, or needs to be, consulted. 'Authority'
here may mean a person who is entitled to have control in
that situation, or rules, regulations, laws or a moral or an
ethical code that are relevant in the situation. In example
(1) the permission granting authority is the addressee;
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example (2) refers to the authority of the regulations of
the library.
Examples of situations in which one can determine from
the extralinguistic context that authority and therefore
permission sense may be involved, are situations where the
social status of the interlocutors is not the same, or
situations in which one interlocutor's ownership or being in
his territory gives him the right to control some actions.
Sometimes inferences like these can be made easily from
the question itself, as in (1) from 'your car' and 'borrow'
(the question 'Can I borrow ...?' would probably always be
regarded as a question about permission). Other times they
have to be deduced from the context only, as for example,
if Bill says to John in John's house
(3) Can I make a phone call?
or presumably sometimes the interlocutors know or believe
that the case is such: in example (2)
(2) Can I take this book out?
the context contains an authority in the sense that library
regulations determine for example that some books are
allowed out of the library and others are not, and the
speaker of (2) shows that he believes that such regulations
may exist.
In contrast to examples (1-3),
(4) Can I get a train to Inverness?
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is less likely to be intended or interpreted as a question
about permission because normally everybody is allowed to
travel by train and no authority applies to the situation.
The concept of frames (see Minsky 1975) is perhaps
useful here; there are frames in which there is an
authority that is regarded as having control over some
things in that frame. In the same way, with dynamic
modality, one has to assume frames that make it possible
for the system to choose the goals that are relevant in
each case; the system has to pick only the goals that are
relevant for the question at hand, rather than consider a
random selection of goals.
Confronted with a question containing can the procedure
should first see whether the situation is such that there
might be an authority who controls the proposed action.
Apart from the general points mentioned above, how a
deduction process like this works is not known, and it is
not possible at this stage to speculate what kind of
algorithm would be needed for this. The following
discussion is based on the assumption that the system has
some mechanism of pinpointing the authority if there is
one.
There are the two obvious cases: either the person the
question is addressed to is the authority (subjective
deontic modality), or the authority is something external to
the interlocutors: a third person, or an institution, laws,
etc. (objective deontic modality).
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To answer questions of subjective deontic modality, such
as
(1) Can I borrow your car?
(5) May I borrow your car?
(6) Must you go?
(7) Could Mr Smith see you tomorrow?
(where the respondent is the authority), the respondent has
to look at his own goals in order to decide what the modal
status of the proposed action is: whether it is permissible,
required, or to be prohibited. In checking the compatibility
of the proposed action with his goals, the same procedure
can be used as for dynamic can or must (if the question
asks for permission or about an obligation).
If the modality is objective, i.e. the authority is some
external source, the answer depends simply on whether the
speaker happens to know what the decision of the deontic
source is: either the speaker knows what the answer of
the deontic source to the question is and is able to report
it, or he does not know it and cannot answer the question
except by acknowledging that he does not know.
In a question-answer situation it is the respondent who
has to decide, irrespective of the meaning intended by the
questioner, whether there is an authority and who or what
it is (whether an answer will be an instance of subjective
or objective deontic modality or neither). For example,
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answers to (1) might be
(8) a. It is not my car, it is my brother's,
you'll have to ask him.
b. It is actually not my car,it is my
brother's, but he never lends it to anybody.
If the system finds that it is the system's permission,
etc. that is being asked about, it will then look at its own
goals to see whether they are in conflict with the
proposition. The respondent's goals may include the goal of
asserting his own authority.
The network presented in section 4.1.3 for dynamic can
and must can be modified to accommodate deontic can and
must by adding nodes for searching for an authority, and
for deciding whether the deontic source is the speaker or
a third party. An (informal) modified network is given in
Figure 6.
It might be argued that if in the case of subjective
deontic modality the speaker simply assesses his own goals
in relation to the proposition before granting or refusing
the permission, one could access these goals directly,
rather than going through the concept of 'deontic source'.
So the difference between subjective deontic and dynamic
modality would be in whose goals are taken into account:
subjective deontic modality would look (mainly) at the
speaker's goals, whereas with dynamic modality the goals of
anybody who is involved in the action may need to be
looked at (the goals of the hearer, the speaker, the agent
























Figure 6 : Decision tree for deontic modality
(this tree can be combined with the one
given in Figure 4. Node 4 of this figure
is inserted between nodes 2 and 5 of
Figure 4. )
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could be represented in the same format as goals.
However, this approach would fail to account for direct
appeals to authority, as in conversations like the following,
which are perhaps unusual but not impossible:
(9) A: Can I borrow your car/take this book out/
take the afternoon off?
B: No.
(10) A: Why not?
B: Because I say so/because that is what
the rules say/because the boss says so.
It can again be argued that as soon as we have a
question with can even if it is intended in the deontic
sense, like (1), the planner is called and it checks whether
there is a plan for the proposition which takes into
account all factors (physical preconditions, goals, permission
by deontic source), not only the permission of the deontic
source. Example (1)
(1) A: Can I borrow your car?
might get the answer
(11) B: I don't mind you borrowing my car, but it
doesn't work.
and in fact a mere 'Yes' would be an odd answer if B knew
that it did not work.
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6. EPISTEMIC MODALITY AND ITS RELATION
TO ROOT MODALITY
This section will deal mainly with subjective epistemic
modality. This is meant unless otherwise specified.
The discussion is concerned with the following points:
Firstly, some well-known differences between epistemic and
root modality are listed, with comments on them and on
some of the modal verbs that occur in the epistemic sense.
Secondly, there is a discussion of the feasibility of
procedural treatment of epistemic modality, and to what
extent the procedures for root and epistemic modality are
parallel to each other.
Root and epistemic modality differ from each other in
the following respects, most of which are well-documented.
Root modality has to do with the feasibility or
necessity of events or actions (dynamic modality) or the
permission or obligation to perform an action (deontic
modality). Epistemic modality has to do with propositions:
it expresses the speaker's assessment of the truth of a
proposition (Palmer 1979: 3-4, Lyons 1977: 797).
In sentences containing root modality the event (the
main predication) is always in the future (or, more exactly,
future in relation to the point of reference). With
epistemic modality, no such restriction applies: the event
or state referred to in the main predication may be past,
present, or future.
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With root modality, there are restrictions on the nature
of the process referred to by the main predication. The
verb has to be a voluntary, agentive verb. The modality is
linked to actions or events; typically, stative verbs and the
progressive aspect do not occur with root modality. This
is clearly the case with deontic modality, which is about
permission etc. for an agent to do something.
There are examples which contain superficially stative
verbs like
(1) You must know this by Monday.
but in these the predication cannot be interpreted as
semantically stative but has acquired a meaning that
implies a transition from one state to another (cf.
Steedman 1977: 229-230). Similarly,
(2) You must be careful.
can be interpreted as an activity: "You must behave
1
carefully" .
As regards dynamic modality, can requires an agentive
predication; when it occurs with inanimate subjects, e.g.
(3) This record player can play for four hours
without attention.
an implicit agent has to be assumed, i.e. "if somebody
chooses to make it do that". Another explanation for
examples like this is that people sometimes attribute
human properties to machines: machines may be talked about
m
2
as if they were agents.
With must, however, there are examples of the following
type, which cannot be explained in terms of acquisition of
another, event-type meaning:
(4) Assistant Quantity Surveyor wanted urgently...
Must have experience in rehabilitation and
restoration works (The Scotsman 14.8.1984)
(5) You must be very fit to be accepted on this
mountaineering course.
These could be paraphrased as meaning something like "to
achieve goal X, the subject must have property Y". These
examples can only be interpreted in the root sense if the
subject is indefinite. Thus (4) says "For this job, we will
only consider applicants who have experience in
rehabilitation and restoration". (5) can only be interpeted
in the root sense if 'you' is the impersonal vou (= one). If
'you' refers to the interlocutor, the sentence does not
express a requirement but an inference, and is epistemic.
If these observations are correct, then dynamic modality
may have a stative (as well as a dynamic) complement: a
transition to the goal state has the precondition that the
subject have property Y.
No restrictions as to the nature of the main predication
apply to epistemic modality. The main predication may
refer to a state, an action in progress, or to an event in
the past, present or future.
Because of the restrictions on the types of predication
that may occur with root modality, ambiguity (or
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indeterminacy) between root and epistemic modality can
only occur when the reference is to a non-progressive
action in the future (cf. Lyons 1977: 826):
(6) He must come tomorrow.
But Palmer (1979: 44) points out that the use of
sentences like (6) in the epistemic sense is rare because of
the ambiguity and the possibility of misinterpretation as a
mand, and if an epistemic sense is intended, there is an
alternative, unambiguous form available:
(7) He must be coming tomorrow.
However, utterances with may and a non-progressive action
can be used in either epistemic or root sense:
(8) He may come tomorrow.
(cf. discussion below).
Some scholars have claimed that epistemic modality
differs from root modality also in that epistemic modality
contains an assessment and an expression of the probability
of the action. Wertheimer (1 972: 125) attributes the
difference between can and may to this. Halliday (1970:
349) says that (epistemic) "modality is the speaker's
assessment of probability and predictability". According to
Lyons (1977: 800) at least objective epistemic modality may
be a qualification in terms of probability, although he
rejects the idea that in everyday use this expression of
probability has anything to do with probability as a
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scientific, calculable concept.
Intuitively, it does seem that at least with epistemic
must and can't, as in
(9) a. It must be raining,
b. It can't be raining.
the speaker somehow expresses his assessment of the
likelihood of whether the proposition is true or not (based
on some argument that he has in mind). However, these
sentences do not mean the same as
(10) a. I think it is likely/probable that it is
raining.
b. I think it is unlikely/improbable that it
is raining.
Rather, they mean "Something makes me think/conclude that
it is raining".
As for may, it is even less appropriate to paraphrase it
with any reference to probability. The following is the
interpretation of may given by Cresswell (1979: 294):
"Nothing in my knowledge rules out the possibility that [it
is raining]".
Modal verbs that are used in the epistemic sense
include may, might, could, must, should, ought to, and the
semi-modals HAVE TO and HAVE GOT TO. In non-assertive
contexts can also occurs. May does not occur in questions
in an epistemic sense. In negated sentences we get cannot.
could not (and cliticised forms) if the modality is negated
(i.e. wide scope: it is impossible that p is true), and may
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not, might not, if the main predication is negated (narrow
scope: it is possible that not p).
The differences between the uses and senses of can and
may are especially interesting and have been discussed by
some linguists.
Coates (1980) observes, on the basis of statistical
analysis of corpuses, that in everyday language, the uses of
can and may hardly overlap at all: can is primarily used for
root possibility, may is primarily used for epistemic
possibility; both are used for permission, but not as
frequently as for possibility (see Coates 1980: 176).
Coates (1980) and Leech and Coates (1980) claim that
although the different senses of can and mav overlap (the
deontic sense), and although the root senses of can may be
seen as related to each other, yet may is clearly
ambiguous: the root and the epistemic senses are clearly
different (cf. discussion on the monosemy/polysemy issue in
chapter 7).
R. Lakoff (1972) explains the difference between can
and may in terms of the actual world versus possible
worlds: may refers to possible worlds, can to the actual
world that the speaker is in. However, her analysis is
limited to sentences of the type
(11) Football players may be sex maniacs.
(12) Football players can be sex maniacs.
in which can occurs in a quantifier sense.
Perkins (1980) takes a strong monosemantic view in
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proposing that can and mav have an identical core meaning,
"K(C does not preclude X)", and that they differ only in that
they are used with different sets of contraints on the
possible values of K, C and X. The following table, adapted
from Perkins (1980: 61, 65-6), gives the types of values the
variables may have, what the modality in question is and
the ground that can and mav cover:
dynamic deontic epistemic
K: natural laws / laws of the society / laws of reason
c. empirical j deontic source / evidence
circumstance





Perkins' wording of the definition of can has been criticised
in section 4.1.1. Apart from that, the level of this analysis
is so general that not much can be said against it; but it
is very difficult to see how to apply this formula either in
interpreting a modalised utterance or in producing one.
Another difference between epistemic and root modality
is seen in cases of necessity, in the nature of the 'cause'
or 'reason' for the necessity. In root modality the
necessity depends on a goal of one or both of the
interlocutors (or the agent); the goal is obviously in the
future:
(13) You must go now (if you want to see the film).
In epistemic modality, as in
1 29
(14) They must have left.
interpreted as "Something that I know causes me to infer
that p is the case", the reason or cause of the inference is
not restricted in time.
Epistemic modality is rare in questions (Palmer 1979: 56).
One would normally use a direct (non-modalised) yes-no
question in asking whether a proposition is true or false
(cf. R. Lakoff 1972: 242). Compare
(15) Are they on holiday?
(16) a. Can they be on holiday?
b. Could they be on holiday?
c. Might they be on holiday?
(15) is the normal question, unless the questioner has some
reason to believe that the respondent does not know (for
certain) whether the proposition is true or not. The
modalised question asks for the respondent's assessment of
the truth of p.
(15) may elicit an epistemically modalised response if
the respondent does not know the answer.
In question-answer dialogues one would thus expect
epistemically modalised statements to be produced in
responses to non-modalised questions (as well as, of course,
to modalised questions), unlike with root modality, where
the question that prompts a modalised response is normally
modalised.
If the respondent does not know whether p is true
(whether they are on holiday), the answer is either 'I don't
know', or a (subjectively) qualified statement; the latter
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could be a modalised statement such as 'They
may/must/can't be'.
In order to see how epistemic modality could be
approached procedurally, let us consider in what respects
such a procedure would be similar to and how it would
differ from the procedure proposed in the previous chapters
for root modality.
Arguments in favour of treating epistemic modality in a
procedure similar to the one already proposed include the
following considerations:
(1) There is the obvious and clear parallelism in the
degrees of modality. Epistemic possibility can be defined
by excluding both impossibility and necessity, as was done
with root possibility.
(2) Examples of dynamic modality can be turned into
examples of epistemic modality: the goal that causes the
necessity in dynamic modality becomes the reason or
explanation that justifies the inference in epistemic
modality:
(17) a. If John wants to see the film,
he must come by seven.
b. If John saw the film, he must
have come by seven.
c. If John wanted to see the film,
he must have come by seven.
(18) a. If you want to get this job,
you must have experience in restoration.
b. If he got the job, he must have
experience in restoration.
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In examples (17), coming by seven is a precondition for
seeing the film; in (17a) the goal of seeing the film creates
the necessity of satisfying the precondition; in (17b) and
(17c) it causes the inference that John must have come by
seven.
In these examples, epistemic and dynamic modality are
exactly parallel: dynamic modality can be turned into
epistemic modality by assuming that the goal has been
achieved (is true in the present state of the world).
But this argument only applies to cases in which root
modality is possible, that is where a transition from one
state to another is involved. There is no root equivalent
of examples like
(9) It must be raining.
(3) There is the argument (cf. Wertheimer 1972, Perkins
1980) that epistemic and root senses can be defined in the
same way if we allow the factors that determine the
modality to be of different types. Root modality is
concerned with preconditions for actions; epistemic modality
would (in addition) look at general rules about the world,
relevant facts that the speaker knows about the
entities/issues in question (e.g. their properties), and so on,
and make inferences on the basis of factors like these.
Arguments against treating epistemic modality in the
same way as root modality include:
(1) When epistemic modality occurs with stative or
progressive verbs, one cannot analyse the sense of the
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modal in terms of plans and goals, as with root modality:
(19) a. This must be John's car.
b. This can't be John's car.
c. This may be John's car.
(20) a. John must be fishing.
b. John may be fishing.
c. John can't be fishing.
Statives and progressives describe what is true in the
present state of the world: no change of state is involved.
Plans and goals involve transitions from one state to
another.
(2) There is a difference in the status of the
proposition (= the complement of the modal verb):
Root modality describes whether it is feasible,
necessary, permitted, etc., to get from one state to
another (whether there is a plan/a strategy for the
action). The status of the proposition is open in the sense
that the action has not taken place and the modality is
not about whether it will take place or not, but about
whether it is feasible (if an agent chooses to carry it out).
The modality itself is part of the ideational meaning of the
utterance, to use Halliday's (1970: 343) term, and the whole
statement is a confident statement which the speaker
believes to be true (cf. also Lyons 1977: 843).
In (subjective) epistemic modality, on the other hand, the
status of the proposition is not open in the sense that the
proposition is actually true or false (at least in cases in
which the reference is to the past or the present), but the
speaker does not know which is the case.
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The fact that a modal verb is used may itself be taken
as a signal that the speaker is not sure but is only giving
his comment. (However, the logical (objective) use of must
and cannot simply indicates that what the speaker says is
based on an argument, that it is a deduction, and the
speaker may be confident about the truth of what he is
saying; e.g. 'Today is Tuesday, so tomorrow must be
Wednesday').
This difference in the status of the modality and of the
proposition explains why one can say
(21) John can come tomorrow but I know he won't,
but it does not seem possible to interpret
(22) John may come tomorrow, but I know he won't.
in an epistemic sense.
The only instances in which, in epistemic modality, the
status of the proposition is open in the actual world occur
when epistemic modality is connected to a future
(non-progressive) action, as in
(23) John may come tomorrow.
(We take the progressive 'John may be coming tomorrow' to
mean "John is intending to come tomorrow" where the
intention is in the present time.)
(23) may be interpreted in two ways, as equivalent to
"John may be coming tomorrow" (cf. Steedman 1977), where
the truth of p is not open (but the speaker does not know
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whether p is the case), or in the sense "It is possible that
John comes tomorrow", i.e. he may decide to come tomorrow
(nobody knows at the moment whether p will be the case).
Other examples which are open in the sense that the event
may happen or not are
(24) It may rain.
(25) He may win (the game).
(3) In determining root modality, when it is linked to a
goal or goals, we need to consider only those factors that
are relevant for the goal(s), i.e. the preconditions for that
goal. Thus in
(26) Can the painters come on the 29th?
if the understood goal is finishing the house by time X, the
respondent needs only to consider the critical path network
in determining the modality. If the point of the question
is whether the painters are free then, the respondent
needs only consider the painters' diary and can ignore other
considerations.
Epistemic modality is not restricted to the
consideration of a limited number of factors in that way.
To answer
(27) Might the painters come on the 29th?
one has to consider anything that might have a bearing on
their coming.
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In view of all the points that have been made so far, an
attempt to find a procedural treatment for epistemic
modality would encounter a number of problems, which can
only be presented here as open questions.
(1) It seems that in answering a question like
(28) Are the painters coming tomorrow?
if the respondent does not know whether their coming has
been arranged or not (which is what the question is
interpreted to be about here), the first point to decide is
whether to answer 'I don't know' or to express a qualified
statement as an opinion. Why do people utter statements
containing their assessment of the truth of something?
The reasons may be social (cf. Halliday 1970, where
epistemic modality is considered as part of the
interpersonal function of language). Perhaps it has also to
do with how much the speaker thinks he knows about the
matter in question. This problem is one of the things that
make it difficult to envisage epistemic modality in a
language understanding system. How does one motivate the
system to volunteer an opinion?
(2) Although the procedure for determining the modality
would in general terms have to proceed in the same way as
for root modality, there are differences that make it
impossible to combine the procedures. The similarity
appears in the way that the degree of modality is defined:
in both cases, it is first determined whether p is possible;
if so, whether p is necessary. If there is nothing that
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makes p necessary, the result is (in epistemic modality)
mav. Thus may, like can, may be defined as "not impossible
and not necessary".
However, the tree for root modality which looks for
plans (and whether they are consistent with goals) cannot
handle the cases mentioned above where no plans are
involved, e.g. stative predicates. The procedure would have
to make inferences or deductions on the basis of other
factors (general principles, knowledge about individuals,
etc.), and it would require some mechanism to search for
these factors.
It is possible, however, at least in cases in which the
predication denotes an action, that the tree for
establishing the degree of root modality is used as part of
the epistemic procedure: if something is dynamically or
deontically impossible, possible or necessary, this fact may
be used in the inference process for determining whether it
is epistemically impossible, possible or necessary.
(3) Another problem is the number of factors involved.
As was pointed out above, in determining root modality,
when the 'point of view' of the question is a particular
goal, only those factors that relate to that goal need to
be considered. With epistemic modality, e.g responding to
(27) or (28), the respondent answers on the basis of what
he knows,' but also knowing or believing that he does not
know all the possibly relevant facts. But he has to try to
consider the question from all points of view, rather than
one point of view.
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It would seem on the basis of the foregoing that it
would be necessary to have a separate, if in many ways
parallel procedure for determining epistemic modality. This
procedure might have access to and use (when appropriate)
the root modality procedure as part of its inference making
process.
Assuming that there is an ambiguity in some modal verbs
between epistemic and root sense, what are the clues that
are used in deciding whether to interpret a modalised
utterance in a root or epistemic sense?
There are some very straightforward clues (already
discussed): If the predication is stative, progressive,
non-agentive, or non-future, the modality is typically
3
epistemic (cf. Coates 1980) . If the predication does not
have any of these features, as in
(29) John may come tomorrow.
(30) John may not come tomorrow.
(31) You must read novels.
the clues have to come form the context in which the
utterance is made (or the utterance remains ambiguous).
Consider also the difference between (31), which may be
deontic, dynamic, or epistemic (if the activity is habitual),
and
(32) You must read this novel.
where the fact that this novel is definite causes the
interpretation of a (single) future action to be strongly
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favoured and makes epistemic interpretation unlikely.
Definiteness and indefiniteness may thus also play a part.
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7. SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
7.1. Monosemv versus polysemy and indeterminacy
One of the questions on which there has been a lot of
debate in connection with modals is whether they are
monosemantic or polysemantic: whether each modal has a
basic meaning, of which its different 'senses' are variations,
or whether the senses are discrete, not explainable in
terms of a 'basic' or 'core' meaning.
Exponents of the monosemantic view include Ehrman
(1966), Wertheimer (1972), and Perkins (1980), and of the
polysemantic view Leech (1971) and Palmer (1979).
Many studies on mood and modality have either not
taken a strong view or have taken an intermediate view:
Leech and Coates (1980) consider root senses to be closely
related to each other but conclude that there is a discrete
demarcation between root and epistemic meaning.
Recently Palmer (1979), Leech and Coates (1980), and
Coates (1980) have, discussed the related problem of
indeterminacy. With many modals, indeterminacy between
the different senses is common in actual usage. It is
therefore necessary to find a description of the modals
that can handle it.
Indeterminacy is more of a problem for the polysemantic
than for the monosemantic hypothesis. If each modal is
assumed to have a basic meaning, the different senses are
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seen as variants of this meaning, rather than as discrete
meanings; indeterminacy between the senses is allowed for.
If, however, the senses of a modal are regarded as discrete
meanings, indeterminacy between the meanings is more
difficult to explain (cf. Leech and Coates 1980: 79-80).
Here the question of polysemy versus monosemy will be
taken up first and then the problem of indeterminacy.
What does it mean for an element to be polysemantic or
monosemantic? If polysemy means that the hearer has to
choose between two or more meanings, as for instance in
You must read novels.
between epistemic and root must (inference vs. obligation
or dynamic necessity), then elements like must and may
certainly are polysemous. But often the hearer also has to
choose between different root senses in order to make an
appropriate response, as with
Can the painters start on the 29th?
(cf. earlier discussion).
On the other hand, one can claim that modals are
monosemantic if their meanings are defined in a very
general way, i.e. if there is a common denominator which is
present in all occurrences of the modal. Thus, for example,
must can be defined as "something requires p" (cf. Perkins
1980). This level of generality has the consequence that
can and may will be defined in an identical way ("nothing
prevents p") (as is done in Wertheimer 1972 and Perkins
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1980). These generalisations may be correct and useful in
that they describe what is common in all the uses of a
given modal (or two modals), but they do not provide the
means for interpreting a modal utterance, because they
necessarily remain at a high level (in a procedural sense)
and ignore the complications and divergences at the lower
levels.
Looking at the issue from the procedural viewpoint,
rather than to ask whether modals are mono- or
polysemantic, it might be more reasonable to ask at what
level in the procedure the differences between the senses
occur, i.e. to what extent a modal is monosemantic or
polysemantic.
The points made in the section on epistemic modality
about the differences between root and epistemic modality
led to the tentative conclusion that these are discrete and
would probably have to be treated by different, although
similar, procedures.
We could say that the difference between the epistemic
and the root senses is at a higher level in the procedural
tree or network than the differences between the
different root senses, which are lower down the tree.
This agrees with the view of Leech and Coates (1980)
that there is a demarcation between root and epistemic
modality, but that different root senses (and different
epistemic senses) are closely related to each other.
However, in the procedural approach, the polysemy versus
monosemy issue does not have to be seen as a burning
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question but can be seen as a matter of viewpoint and
degree.
We will next look at a description of indeterminacy and
then at how the procedural system envisaged here could
handle it.
Leech and Coates (1980) divide indeterminacy into three
types: gradience, ambiguity and merger.
Gradience occurs when there are two senses, or two
categories of meaning (e.g. can "permission" and "possibility")
with cases which are intermediate between the two
categories. The intermediate cases may be interpreted as
being closer to one or the other of the meanings, i.e. there
is a continuum from one meaning to another.
A modal is ambiguous if the addressee has to choose
either one meaning or another; contextual clues generally
resolve the ambiguity.
A merger of two meanings occurs if the two
interpretations are mutually compatible in the given
context, so that the modal may be interpreted as having
both meanings (see Leech and Coates 1980).
They point out that neither indeterminacy in general nor
these three types of it are restricted to modals.
Coates (1980) distinguishes the same three types of
indeterminacy, although there are some differences in the
way she defines them, as in her study the meanings of
modals are described in terms of fuzzy set theory.
In both studies, the examples given of gradience are
continua between two root senses (or, in one instance,
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between two epistemic senses), but there are no examples
where gradience would cross the line between root and
epistemic modality. The examples of ambiguity and merger,
on the other hand, are cases in which one of the two
senses involved is root and the other epistemic. In a
merger the difference between the epistemic and the root
sense is neutralised.
I will only discuss the kind of indeterminacy that occurs
between different root senses, i.e. what Leech and Coates
call gradience. In view of the fact that the discussion of
epistemic modality presented earlier is itself very
tentative it seems unwise, on the basis of this groundwork,
to extend the discussion to cases of merger, even if this is
an important question.
In order to see how the proposed procedural system
would handle gradience, the examples given by Leech and
Coates (1980) will be reproduced below and examined.
The modal can, they claim, has two gradients, one from
the sense of "permission" to the sense of "possibility", and
the other from "ability" to "possibility". As examples of
the former they give:
(1) You can' t do that -- I forbid it. permission
(2) You can' t do that -- it's against the
rules.
(3) You can' t do that -- it would be breaking
the law.
(4) You can' t do that -- everyone would think
you are mad.
(5) You can' t do that -- it wouldn't be
reasonable.
(6) You can' t do that -- it wouldn't be right.
(7) You can' t do that -- it is contrary to the
law of gravity. possibility
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The procedures outlined in chapters 4 and 5 would deal
with these as follows: In (1) the speaker is the authority;
the prohibition is based on the speaker's goals. In (2) and
(3) the authority is not the speaker but an external
authority (rules, the law). In (7) the action is impossible
because it is incompatible with a law of nature; in other
words, the physical preconditions do not exist or are not
satisfied.
Examples (4), (5) and (6) have to do with a code of
behaviour, ethics or morals. These are the most difficult
to fit into a simple network like the one given in Figures
4 and 6, and the problems they present are philosophical
rather than linguistic. Is a moral or an ethical code to be
regarded as something imposed by an external authority, or
imposed by the speaker himself (in which case it could be
seen as a goal, i.e. the goal of acting in accordance with
the code)?
None of these examples exhibit a gradient in the sense
that there would be a degree of permission and a decree of
possibility present in the same token.
However, it is possible to envisage examples in which
you do have both the permission and the possibility sense
present in one utterance, for example, the one discussed
earlier (section 4.1.3.):
(8) A: Can you drive me to the airport
tomorrow morning?
B1: No, I can't, because...
B2: Yes, I can.
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which may question all aspects of feasibility (are you
allowed to, are you free, is your car working, etc), or the
question may be vague and not intended in any such specific
sense; and the respondent may take any or all of these
aspects into account when answering the question.
The network given in Figures 4 and 6 proceeds in the
following way (but as we have stressed, this is only one
possible order of the steps that are needed): it checks the
physical preconditions: if p is possible with respect to
these, it checks whether we have a context where there is
an authority that may have control over the possibility,
etc. of p; if there is no authority, it checks whether there
are any relevant goals, and whether p is possible, etc.,
with respect to these. But one might want to check the
goals also in a case in which there is an authority, if the
authority permits p. To do this, we need access from the
results of the deontic network to the part of the
procedure that tries to find a goal and then see whether p
is possible with respect to the goal.
It might be better to regard the three parts of the
network (the part without goals, the part that deals with
deontic modality, and the part that deals with
goal-oriented dynamic modality) as separate procedures,
with the option that one or more of them could be called,
depending on the point of view of the question and
whether there is any indeterminacy.
This procedural approach would be able to deal with
indeterminacy if indeterminacy is understood in the sense
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that one or more senses may be present in a modalised
utterance.
However, one cannot interpret utterances with can, for
example (8:A) or (8:B1), as having some degree of the
permission sense and a degree of the possibility sense, i.e.
as occupying some place on a gradient from one sense to
the other. Although one can have more than one sense
present in one utterance, each of these senses is either
there completely or not at all. This is how the (extended)
procedural system would work. For example, the system
finds that p is possible or impossible as regards physical
preconditions; if it finds a goal, p is either possible,
impossible or necessary with respect to the goal. The
results of the different components are not quantified in
terms of their respective importance.
(It may be the case, however, that with modals like
should and ought to one does get a gradient from one sense
to another, since these modals themselves seem to express
some kind of modified rather than absolute necessity.)
The remarks made above apply also to the indeterminacy
between the "ability" and "possibility" senses of can, and
between the senses of root must.
7.2. Semantics and pragmatics
Leech (1983) discusses the roles of semantics and
pragmatics in the study of language. He argues for a view
where these are seen as two separate domains and as
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operating in different ways from each other, but the
domains are complementary. Semantics belongs to the
formal, abstract system of language, pragmatics is the
study of the meaning of utterances in use. Leech lists a
number of significant characteristics which distinguish
pragmatics from semantics and which derive from this
essential difference of semantics having to do with form
and pragmatics with function (Leech 1983).
The procedural account of can and must presented in
chapter 4 does not make a clear difference between
semantics and pragmatics. The meaning of the modals is
not distinguished from their use in a context; the two are
interwoven in the same procedure.
One could say that the procedure defines 'can(p)' as
either "p is feasible" or "p is feasible but not necessary"
or "p is permitted", and 'must(p)' as either "p is necessary"
or "p is obligated", and that these are the semantic
1
representations of can and must.
However, in computing these results the procedure makes
use of pragmatic knowledge and principles. The most
important of these is taking into account the goals of the
interlocutors, which in the context of modality are
necessary in determining from what 'point of view' the
feasibility or necessity is considered, and in excluding or
establishing necessity, since we have argued that dynamic
necessity is always linked to goals. An essential feature in
the procedure for determining the degree of modality is
the use of the focus of the question, which can also be
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seen as something which is governed by pragmatic factors:
what is in focus is linked to what the speaker's
conversational goals are (cf. ch. 3).
But in the procedure the semantics and the pragmatics
interact in a way that would make it impossible, for
example, to extract the two aspects into separate parts or
procedures, although one can obviously describe some
elements of the procedure as semantic and others as
pragmatic.
This seems to be incompatible with some of the
postulates presented by Leech (1983) about the differences
between semantics and pragmatics: the first postulate says
that the "semantic representation (or logical form) of a
sentence is distinct from its pragmatic interpretation"
(Leech 1983: 5). In the procedural account, the sense of the
modal (within the semantic representation of the sentence)
is not defined as distinct from the pragmatics of the
context; it is only defined after the pragmatic
considerations have played their part in the definition of
the meaning of the modal. However, if the semantic
representation of can is given simply as "feasible" or
"possible" and that of must as "necessary", then there is no
incompatibility. But in defining what "feasible" or
"possible" or "necessary" mean the semantics has to be
combined with pragmatics.
The interaction of semantics and pragmatics is perhaps
not incompatible with all the postulates given by Leech
(1983), e.g. with the points that semantics is rule-governed,
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and its explanations primarily formal, whereas pragmatics is
principle-controlled and its explanations primarily
functional (Leech 1983: 5). The steps in the modal
procedure which have to do directly with the degree of
modality (whether here is a plan for p or not, whether p is
necessary) could be seen as semantic rules, whereas finding
the ulterior and conversational goals (including finding the
focus of the sentence) is done primarily on the basis of
pragmatic principles.
In conclusion, in the procedure developed here for
determining the degree of modality when answering
questions, the semantic side cannot proceed without the




This thesis has explored how some aspects of modality
could be treated in a procedural framework.
Procedures were defined for the dynamic senses of the
modals can and must. Although the domain within which
this was done was restricted, the procedural definitions
for the modals are general and could be used in other
domains.
The framework of a language understanding system
brought out some problems which are general and would
probably be encountered in any such system but turned out
to be central to the processing of modals, and these had to
be addressed before a procedural definition of the modals
was possible. The problems that were of most concern here
are the concept of focus in questions on the one hand, and
the higher level (non-linguistic) goal(s) of the interlocutors,
on the other.
The focus of a question was used in the sense of what
the speaker's attention is focused upon, and was related to
the conversational goal of the speaker in uttering the
question.
It was argued that questions containing dynamic
modality are often intended and interpreted in the sense of
whether the proposed action is possible or necessary from
a particular 'point of view'. The point of view is in fact
often some (non-linguistic) goal of one or both of the
interlocutors.
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The procedure for dynamic modals therefore has to look
for a possible goal to which the modalised question may be
related. It was argued that dynamic necessity is always
linked to a goal or goals, and that possibility often is but
not always.
Recognition of the focus of a question and of the
possible higher level goal of the addressee is obviously
important in making an utterance relevant to the hearer.
These conclusions accord with the results of recent
research in both linguistics, where there has been a lot of
work on pragmatic concepts like relevance, and in artificial
intelligence, where there has been interesting work in the
development of plan inference mechanisms.
The procedure for dynamic modals was presented in
detail in chapter four. Determining whether an action is
feasible (possible) is done by asking the general purpose
planner, which is accessible from the system, to find a plan
for the proposed action. The procedure also checks
whether the question is related to a goal, and whether the
plan for the proposed action (if there is one) is compatible
with achieving the goal.
In order to exclude, or establish, necessity of the
action, the procedure has to check whether an alternative
plan is possible and compatible with the goal. An
alternative plan is found by changing the value of the
focus of the question.
The procedure can give the any of the following results:
The action is possible and compatible with the goal
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("can(p)"); the action is possible but incompatible with the
goal ("not(can(p)) if g"); the action is impossible
("not(can(p))"); the action is necessary if the goal is to be
achieved ("must(p) if g"); and the action is predicted to
happen (Mwill(p)"). For answering a question, the result is
then formulated into an appropriate response.
The same procedure can be used for determining the
degree of modality in answering questions containing can as
well as those containing must, if there is a separate
component for formulating the answer on the basis of the
result (the degree of modality) given by the modality
procedure.
Both yes-no and wh-questions were discussed. The
procedures that determine the degree of modality for these
are similar. Apart from the obvious difference that
wh-questions ask for a value for the focus, there are also
some differences between the two types as regards
negation.
It was proposed that deontic modality could be handled
procedurally in a similar network as dynamic modality, or
as part of one enlarged network which would cover both
dynamic and deontic modals. The procedure for deontic
modality has to establish first whether the situation or
context of utterance is one where there is an authority
who has the right to control some actions. If the speaker
is the authority, the relevant goals are his own goals. The
procedure can then proceed as with dynamic modality,
relating the modality to these goals. How it is established
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whether there is an authority in the situation is an open
question.
Epistemic modality and especially its relation to root
modality was also discussed, although at a more general
level. The tentative conclusion was that although there is
a clear parallelism between these modalities, the
differences between them suggest that it is better to
regard them as distinct categories. An example of the
close connection between the two modalities is that there
are examples of root necessity which are exactly parallel
to epistemic examples: in the first, the necessity of p is
caused by a goal; in the second, the knowledge that the
goal has been achieved is the reason for the inference that
P must be the case. Both are based on the fact that the
action is a precondition of the goal.
But the differences seem to outweigh the similarities.
For example, the point made above does not apply to
stative and progressive predications, but only to dynamic
ones. Root modality may be concerned with one point of
view only (related to one goal), whereas in epistemic
modality all factors that might have a bearing on the
truth of the proposition have to be considered.
The chapter on epistemic modality also dealt with some
of the problems that would be encountered in the attempt
to define epistemic modality procedurally.
In the light of the proposals made in this study, the
question of whether modals are monosemantic or
polysemantic was not seen as an either-or question but as
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a question about the level of analysis on which the
differences between the senses of a modal begin to appear.
In the proposed system semantics and pragmatics are
combined in the same procedure. Although it would be
possible to point to parts of the procedure and call that
semantics, the semantic parts cannot function without
pragmatic information about the conversational and other
goals of the interlocutors.
Since this thesis concentrated on a few modals in their
dynamic senses, there is obviously a great deal of work to
be done if this approach is to be extended to cover other
modals, as well as the uses of modals with reference to
past time.
Several interesting questions were treated only
tentatively: one of the most important ones is the
distinction between root and epistemic modality and how
people tell which one is intended when they are
interpreting a modalised utterance.
Apart from these large areas, more work is needed also
on some phenomena that were highlighted by the procedural
approach of this study. It has not been possible to explore
here how the focus and the goals are found. Of the
possible clues for these, some are likely to be linguistic
and some non-linguistic. One could say that inferences that
are based on non-linguistic clues need not concern the
linguist; yet anyone who wants to include modals in a
language understanding system will have to confront these
problems. Although some work on how to find the focus
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and how to infer the interlocutor's goals has been done in
both linguistics and artificial intelligence, the results so




This appendix contains a listing of the program,
comments on the parser, and examples of input and output
of (i) the parser and (ii) of the whole program.
First, the routines for the parser and for answering
modalised questions and an example database are listed. To
run the program, the planner (see Warren 197 4) is needed,
and a goal has to be asserted.
LISTING OF THE ROUTINES






/* 'read_in' and 'removelast' convert the input sentence












/* Parser starts here. For 'aux' read 'modal auxiliary' .
Variables ending in -m are for semantic representations.
'
Fma' and 'Fla' are focus variables. */
?- lib(dcgs). /* This calls the Prolog grammar rule
notation routine */
/* Rule 1: */
sentence(qu(Type,Qm), Fma,Fla) --> question(Type,Qm, Fma,Fla).
/* Rule 2: */
sentence(decl(Declm), Fma, Fla) --> decltfin, Declm, L, Fma, Fla).
/* Rule 3: positive yes-no questions */
question(yesno, M, Fma, Fla) --> auxfpos, Scope, Auxm),
decllbase, Sm, [yesno], Fma, Fla),
{M=..[Auxm,Sm]}.
/* Rules 4-7 are for wh-questions */
/* Rule 4: wh + can + not, wide scope */
question(Wh, no(M), Fma, Fla) --> whword(Wh), aux(pos,scope 1,Auxm)
np(Nm, Fma), [not] ,
vp(base,Nm,Sm,[Wh].Fla) ,
{M=..[Auxm,Sm]}.
/* Rule 5: wh + can't, wide scope */
question(Wh, no(M), Fma, Fla) --> whword(Wh), aux(neg,scopel,Auxm),
decl(base,Sm,[Wh], Fma,Fla),
{M=..[Auxm,Sm]} .
/* Rule 6: wh + mustn't, narrow sope */
question(Wh, M, Fma, Fla) --> whword(Wh), aux(neg,scope2,Auxm),
decl(base,Sm,[Wh], Fma,Fla),
{M=..[Auxm,no(Sm)]} .
/* Rule 7: wh * can or must (+ not), narrow scope if negative */




/* Rules 8-13 are for negative yes-no questions */
/* Rule 8: aux + not. positive expectation */
question(agree, M, Fma.Fla) --> auxtpos, Scope, Auxm), np(Nm, Fma),
[not], vp(base. Nm, Sm, L, Fla),
{M= . .[Auxm.Sm]}.
/* Rule 9: can + not, neg. exp., wide scope */
question(agree, no(M), Fma. Fla) --> auxtpos, scopel, Auxm),
np(Nm, Fma), [not] ,
vp(base, Nm, Sm, L, Fla),
[M= . .[Auxm,Sm]}.
/* Rule 10: must + not, neg. exp., narrow scope */
question(agree, M, Fma, Fla) --> aux(pos, scope2, Auxm), np(Nm,Fma),
[not], vptbase. Nm.Sm, L, Fla),
{M=..[Auxm,no(Sm)]}.
/* Rule 11: aux + n't. pos. exp. */
question(agree, M, Fma, Fla) --> auxtneg, Scope, Auxm),
decltbase, Sm, L, Fma, Fla),
{M=..[Auxm,Sm]}.
/* Rule 12: can + n't, neg. exp., wide scope */
question(agree, no(M), Fma, Fla) --> auxtneg, scopel, Auxm),
decllbase, Sm, L, Fma, Fla),
{M=..[Auxm.Sm]}.
/* Rule 13: must + n't, neg. exp., narrow scope */
question(agree, M, Fma, Fla) --> auxtneg, scope2, Auxm),
decl(base,Sm, L. Fma, Fla),
{M=..[Auxm.no(Sm)]}.
/* Rule 14: */
decltType, Declm, L, Fma, Fla) --> np(Nm,Fma),
vptType, Nm, Declm, L, Fla).
/* Rules 15-20 rewrite the v
/* Rule 15: can + not */
vptfin, Nm, no(M), L, Fla)-->
phrase */
auxtpos, scopel, Auxm),
[not], vptbase, Nm, Sm, L, Fla),
[M=..[Auxm,Sm]}.
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I* Rule 16: can't */
vptfin, Nm, no(M), L, Fla) --> auxtneg, scopel. Auxm),
vptbase, Nm, Sm,L, Fla),
[M= . .[Auxm,Sm]}.
/* Rule 17: aux + vp ; if vp is negative, narrow scope */
vptfin,Nm, M, L. Fla) --> aux(pos, Scope, Auxm),
vptbase, Nm, Sm, L, Fla),
[M=..[Auxm,Sm]}.
/* Rule 18: mustn't */
vptfin, Nm, M, L, Fla) --> auxtneg, scope2, Auxm),
vp(base, Nm, Sm,l, Fla).
[H=..[Auxm,no(Sm)]} .
/* Rule 19: the condition in curly brackets ensures that all
negative yes-no questions are parsed as agreement
questions */
vp(base, Nm, no(Sm), L, Fla) --> [not], vptbase,Nm, Sm, L, Fla),
tL\ = = [yesno]} .
/* Rule 20: */
vptType, Nm, Vpm, L, Fla) --> verbtType, Vm). prep_p(Advm, L, Fla),
[Vpm=..[Vm,Nm,Advm]}.
/* Rule 21: */
np(Nm.Fma) --> det(Detm), noun(Nm,Fma).
/* Rule 22: */
prep_p(Num, L, Num) --> prep(Prepm), nountTime, Fma), numeral(Num).
/* Rule 23: */
prep_p(when, L, Fla) --> [], {nonvar(L), L=[when]}.
det(the) -->[the] .
noun(plumbers,Fma) --> consumeword(plumbers , Fma).
noun(electricians,Fma) --> consumeword(electricians , Fma).
noun(plasterers, Fma) --> consumeword(plasterers, Fma).
noun(painters, Fma) --> consumeword(painters. Fma).
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auxlpos, scopel, can) --> [can].
auxlneg, scopel, can) --> [can] , ['1''],[t].
auxlneg, scopel.can) --> [cannot].
auxtpos, scope2, must) --> [must].
aux(neg, scope2, must)--> [mustn] ,[""], [t] .
verblType, starttime) [come].
verblType, starttime) --> [start].
whword(when) --> [when].
prep(on) --> [on],
nountday, Fma) --> [day].
numeral(X) --> [X], {integer(X)}.
consumeword(W. W) --> [' Z ' ] , [ W] , !.
consumeword(W,Fma) --> [W].
/* End of parser */
/ * Procedures for answering ves-no questions
containing ' can' or 'must' */
answercan(P, Foe,Mod):- addgoals(P,G , PG) , anscan1(P,PG,Foe,Mod).





X\ = = Foe,






'Yes, indeed they must if the goal is to be met',
'Yes, they must if the goal is to be met'),
nl, ! .
anscani(P1 .Foc.X,Mod):-




write('No, they cant if the goal is to be met'),
nl, ! .
anscan3(P,PG,Foe,Mod):- write('No,it is impossible"), nl.
write_either(can,X,Y):- write(X).
write_either(must,X,Y):- write(Y).
/* Procedures for answering when-auestions




alter(Foe,T,PG , PG 1 ) ,
alter(Foe,T1,PG,PG2 ) ,
alter(Foe,T1,P,P1 ) ,




plans(PG1,start), T1 \== T,
write('They can start for instance on day '),
write(T), writet'.'), nl. !.
answhencan2(P1,PG1,T,ti);- answhencan4{P1,T,T1).
answhencani(P2,7,T1):-
plans(P2, start), T1 \== T,
writet'They must start on day '),
write(T), writef' if the goal is to be met.'), nl, !.
answhencani(P2,T,T1):- writef'They will start on day '),
write(T), write('.'), nl.
answhencan3(P.PG.Foc):-
alter(Foe,T , P , P 1 ) ,
plans(P1.start) ,
write(
'It is impossible to do that job if the goal is to be met.'),
nl, ! .
answhencan3(P,PG,Foe):- writel'It is impossible to do that job'),
nl.
/* Utilities for 'answercan' and 'answerwhencan' */





alter 1(P.Q.P.Q) ! .
alter 1(P.Q.G.G) .
alterlist(P,Q,[],[]) .
alterlist(P,Q,[HI|TI].[H0|TO] ) : - alter{P,Q.HI.HO),
alterlist(P,Q,TI ,TO) .
reconstruct(X . X , [ ] ) : - !.
reconstruct(SO.GO.AO) : - SO=..[G0|AO].
addgoals(P , G,PG) : - findsettX, goal(X), G). attach(P,G.PG ) .
attach ( PHS.PT , G, PHS<Result) : - !, attach ( PT , G , Result) .
attach(P,empty,P ) : - ! .
attach ( P , G , PS.G) .














merge ( H , T , HS.T ) .
setid(0).






S.starttime ( J 1 , T 1 ) Srduration ( J 1 ■ T2 ) S. (X is TI+T2)
























Some comments on the parser
A general outline of the parser was given in section
2.2.2. A summary of the main points is given below
together with some more detailed comments on specific
rules.
The parser was written using the method described in
Pereira and Warren (1980: 252-253). It takes the input
sentence and produces a semantic representation (SR) as its
output. Each syntactic constituent is assigned a SR as it
is being parsed and the SR of the sentence is built up from
the SRs of the constituents as they are passed up the
parse tree.
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Many of the rules are based on rules given by Gazdar,
Pullum and Sag (1982).
Aspects of grammar that have no direct bearing on the
rules for modal auxiliaries are treated as simply as
possible. For example, noun phrases are treated as
unanalysed wholes. Input sentences are first rewritten
either as declarative or as interrrogative (questions).
Questions are of three types: yes-no questions, negative
yes-no questions, and wh-questions.
Negative yes-no questions are distinguished from
positive yes-no questions: the latter are neutral as to the
answer they expect (positive or negative), whereas the
former are usually biased towards either a positive or a
negative answer. For example,
Shouldn't I tell him (that the roof leaks)?
can be interpreted either (1) as having the assumption "I
should tell him" and asking for agreement (i.e. "Isn't it the
case that I should tell him?"), or (2) as having the
assumption "I should not tell him" and asking for agreement
(i.e. "Is it the case that I should not tell him?"). Notice
that the answers are different depending on which
interpretation is chosen; for (1) the answers could be
Yes, you should. (agreeing)
No, you don't have to. (disagreeing)
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but for (2) they would be
No, you shouldn't. (agreeing)
Yes, you can (if you wish). (disagreeing)
(See Bolinger 1957: 99-1 10 for a detailed discussion of
conduciveness in negative questions.) Negative yes-no
questions will here for convenience be called agreement
questions.
As yes-no questions in this parser are always positive,
only one rule is needed to rewrite them (rule 3).
For wh-questions and agreement questions more rules
are needed because of variations in meaning caused by
different scopes of negation with different modals, and
because questions with negative forms of modal auxiliaries
(e.g. can't, mustn't) have to be dealt with by separate rules
from questions with negation by not (see below). In the
case of agreement questions more rules are needed also
because of the different possible bias (positive or negative)
of the question.
Similarly, several rules are needed for rewriting verb
phrases in order to handle negation and scope correctly.
The grammar employs features which can be attached to
non-terminals and to terminals. For example, verb phrases
and verbs have either the feature 'finite' or the feature
'base', depending on whether the verb phrase contains (or
the verb is) a finite or a base form of the verb.
Modal auxiliaries are defined by means of features as
either positive or negative and as having either wide or
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narrow scope. The need to define each modal as either
positive or negative arises because modals with so-called
clitic negatives are treated as lexical items and have
entries in the dictionary as independent units (this view of
modals with the so-called clitic negation is taken for
instance by Dowty 1979: 348 and Gazdar, Pullum St Sag 1981;
for arguments for its defense, see also Zwicky and Pullum
1982). The scope definition is needed for the obvious
reason that with some modals negation has wide scope,
with others narrow scope; cf.
The painters can't come tomorrow.
(= It is not possible that the painters come
tomorrow)
The painters mustn't come tomorrow.
(= It is necessary that the painters do not come
tomorrow).
Modal auxiliaries thus appear in the dictionary in the
following form:
aux(pos, scope!, must) --> [must].
aux(neg, scope2, must) --> [mustn't].
The third argument of 'aux' is the semantic representation
of the word. The fact that mustn't is negative cannot be
represented in the SR because mustn't has narrow scope, i.e.
it is not the modality which is negated in a sentence
containing mustn't but the proposition under must. Instead
the feature 'neg' is passed up the tree with the semantic
representation "must" and made use of when the SR of the
whole sentence is being built.
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Some information about the parse tree for the sentence
is passed down the tree in the parsing process and this
information is used as a condition for the application of
some rules. In this fragment this is necessary in two
cases.
Firstly, the rule for (positive) yes-no questions contains
the feature 'yesno' (the list L is instantiated as [yesno]);
this feature is passed down the tree. The rule that
rewrites a verb phrase as a negated verb phrase,
vp(base,..., L,...) --> [not], vp(base,..., L,...),
(L\==[yesno]}.
(Rule 19)
(given here in a simplified form) has the condition that it
cannot be applied if L=[yesno], that is if it is part of a
tree that has the feature 'yesno'. This is to ensure that
all yes-no questions with not are parsed as 'agreement'
questions, not as 'yesno' questions.
Secondly, wh-questions pass down the wh-word with
which the question begins, so that it can be inserted into
the right slot in the SR once the parser finds a zero
realization of the right syntactic constituent.
For instance, in the question
When can the painters come?
the wh-word is found to be when and the context variable
L is instantiated as [when]. This argument is passed down
through rules 14 and 20 to the rules which expand
prepositional phrases (rules 22-23). The prepositional phrase
168
(here a time adverbial) can be realized as zero if the
context variable is instantiated to a wh-word (in this case
[when]).
Example input and output, of the parser
The following is a list of examples of the types of
sentences that the parser can handle. It is capable of
giving a set of all the possible interpretations in cases
where the sentence is ambiguous. (This feature is not
exploited by the system as a whole, however, because the
planner cannot handle all the types of sentences that the
parser can.) The input to the parser is preceded by the
symbol | : and the output is printed on the lines following
the input. Indication of the focus is not included in these
examples.
|: The painters can start on day 5.
decl(can(starttime(painters.5)))
|: The painters, must start on day 5.
decl(must(starttime(painters.5)))
|: The painters can't start on day 5.
decl(no(can(starttime(painters.5))))
|: The painters can not start on day 5.
decl(no(can(s tarttime(painters,5))))
decl(can(no(starttime(painters,5))))
| -. The painters mustn't come on day 5.
decl(must(no(starttime(painters,5))))
|: The painters must not come on day 5.
decl(must(no(starttime(painters,5))))
|: Can the painters start on day 5?
qu(yesno,can(starttime(painters,5)))
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|: Can't the painters start on day 5?
qu(agree.can(start time(painters,5)))
qu(agree,no(can(starttime(painters.5))))
| : Can the painters not come on day 5?
qu(agree.can(starttime(painters.5)))
qu(agree.no(can(starttime(painters.5))))
|: Must the painters come on day 5?
qu(yesno.must(starttime(painters,5)))
| : Mustn't the painters come on day 5?
qu(agree,must(starttime(painters.5)))
qu(agree,must(no(starttime(painters,5))))
|: Must the painters not start on day 5?
qu(agree,must(starttime(painters,5)))
qu(agree,must(no(s tarttime(painters,5))))
| : When can the painters come?
qu(when.cant starttime(painters,when)))
|: When can't the painters come?
qu(when,no(can(s tarttime(painters,when))))
| : When can the painters not come?
qu(when,no(can(starttime(pa inters,when))))
qu(when,can(no(starttime(painters,when))))
|: When must the painters start?
qu(when,must(starttime(painters,when)))
|: When mustn't the painters start?
qu(when,must(no(starttime(painters.when))))
|: When must the painters not start?
qu(when,must(no(starttime(painters,when))))
|: The painters can not not start on day 5.
decl(no(can(no(starttime(painters,5)))))
decl(can(no(no(s tarttime(painters,5)))))
| : The painters must not not start on day 5.
decl(must(no(no(starttime(painters,5))))!
|: The painters can't not come on day 5.
decl(no(can(no(starttime(painters.5)))))
|: Can't the painters not come on day 5?
qu(agree,can(no(starttime(painters,5))))
qu(agree,no(can(no(starttime(painters,5)))))




Examples of input and output of the query program
(A goal has been asserted)
| : Can the plumbers come on day 1?
Yes, indeed they must if the goal is to be met.
| : Can the plumbers come on day 2?
No, they cant if the goal is to be met.
| : When can the plumbers start?
They must start on day 1 if the goal is to be met.
| : Must the electricians start on day 3?
Yes. they must if the goal is to be met.
(After the goal has been changed to a later date:)
| : Can the plumbers start on day 1?
Yes .
| : Must the plumbers start on day 1?
No, they dont have to.
| : When can the electricians start?
They can start for instance on day 3.




Notes to Chapter 1
1 . .
For the delimitation and definition of modal verbs from
the grammatical point of view, see Huddleston (1976),
Palmer (1979: section 9.4), Coates (1980: section 2.1),
Huddleston (1980). For comprehensive accounts of the
details of grammar and of the use of modals in English,
based on corpus analysis, see Ehrman (1966), Palmer (1979),
Coates (1980). Brown and Miller (1975) and Brown and
Millar (1980) analyse the use of modals in some dialects of
Scottish English.
2
Lyons' treatment of epistemic and deontic modality has
some aspects in common with Boyd and Thorne (1969). They
also include illocutionary furce in the analysis of the
meanings of modals, assigning subjective epistemic
possibility and necessity to the component that expresses
illocutionary force, and deontic modality to the
propositional component.
Notes to Chapter 2
This example has been adapted from one given in Wiest
and Levy (1977), A Management Guide to PERT/CPM. The
example given by them has already been simplified and does
not contain all the information that a contractor would
possibly require. I have simplified it further for the
purposes of this study.
172
In a real situation, the system would have to be able to
adjust the network according to how the situation changes,
what is agreed, etc. For example, if the plumbers can
start any time between days 7 and 9, and it then agreed
that they start on day 9, the possible starting times for
the rest of the network will have to recalculated.
3 ...
See Fikes and Nilsson (1971). There is a good description
also in Bundy (1983).
4
The problem of how to deal with statements from the
hearer's point of view is not tackled here. See Winograd
(1972: 142) for a discussion of the considerable problems
encountered in dealing with statements.
Notes to Chapter 3
In their terminology, the nucleus of a tone unit is "the
peak of greatest prominence within the tone unit" (Quirk et
al. 1972:1044).
2
Sidner's proposal is controversial, but it is not possible
to discuss it in detail here.
Notes to Chapter 4
1
There are at least two other uses of can which are
often distinguished from these three senses: (i) It can
express existential modality (Palmer 1979: 152-153), as in
Welshmen can be tall.
Rocks can fall on this path.
In this sense, can is regarded as equivalent to the
quantifier some or sometimes.
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Can has the advantage over some in sentences like the
above that it does not have to refer to a particular time;
with some, the verb has to be tensed; for example, 'Some
Welshmen are tall' has a narrower interpretation than
'Welshmen can be tall'.
Can is the only one of the modals that has this
existential sense. This usage is different from other
senses also in that the negation does not have a quantifier
sense:
Welshmen cannot be tall. =/= No Welshmen are tall.
The link between the existential sense of can and the
possibility sense is the position they occupy in the
tripartitions that they belong to: the first sense is in the
intermediate position of the tripartition of quantification
(e.g. all - some - none): the second sense the intermediate
member in the modal tripartition (necessity - possibility -
impossibility) (Jespersen 1924: 324-5; cf. also von Wright
1951; Palmer 1979: 152-3).
There will be no attempt to tackle the existential
sense of can in this study.
(ii) CAN is used with the so-called private verbs like
SEE, HEAR, REMEMBER, etc. It can be argued that this usage
is non-modal, since in a sentence like
I can see the moon.
'I can see' is equal to 'I see' (Vendler 1967: 105). (The
sentence can of course also have a modal interpretation.)
See Vendler (1967: 105) for a discussion of the difference
between this usage and the ability sense of CAN. The usage
with the private verbs is perhaps an idiomatic feature of
English; in many other languages (e.g. German, Swedish,
Finnish) no modal is used in equivalent sentences.
Palmer (1979) mentions other, derived uses of CAN.
2 .
To be consistent, one would also have to give this
answer as an explanation of 'No, they cannot' if the reason
for the impossibility was that the starting time had
already been arranged, e.g. 'No, they cannot; they will come
on the 28th'. Cf. below)
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It is interesting that many languages use separate verbs
for the sense of possibility, on the one hand, and for the
sense "know how, have the skill" to do something, on the
other hand; for example, French pouvoir and savoir , Finnish
voida and osata.
4 .
We will ignore for the time being the goals that might
have to be considered (in this case those of the
respondent) and the fact that this utterance is a request.
These points do not alter the fact that the feasibility of
the proposed action has to be ascertained.
Notes to Chapter 6
1
The fact that a predicate like be careful can also occur
in the progressive, e.g.
She is being very careful not to upset her mother,
also shows that it may have a dynamic interpretation.
2
When can occurs in the existential sense, it may have an
inanimate subject:
Rocks can fall on this path.
There are also cases with inanimate subjects which are
more difficult to explain. Ehrman (1966: 13) gives the
example
A dark bathroom can be pretty scary ...
and Leech (1971: 220)
The monsoon can be dangerous.
Although it is possible to interpret these in the
existential sense, neither Ehrman nor Leech do that.
Ehrman interprets her example as having an implied
if-clause: if circumstances are right, a dark bathroom is
scary (Ehrman 1966:13). But cf. Austin (1961) for arguments
against analysing can as expressing conditionality.
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Coates (1980) gives statistical correlations of features
like these with different modalities. She also describes a
program which is designed to determine whether must is
epistemic or root in a given utterance (Coates 1980: 100ff.).
Notes to chapter 7
i
In Figures 1-4 as they stand at the moment the results
of the procedures are given in terms of the modal verbs
themselves. They should be given as representations like
the above to capture both the detail of the sense in
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